Competition and cooperation in mutual fund families

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Evans, Richard Burtis; Prado, Melissa Porras; Zambrana, Rafael
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.09.004
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 168-188
• 关键词: Mutual fund; MANAGER; COMPENSATION; incentives; COMPETITION; COOPERATION; Cross-holding; performance; cross-subsidization; internal capital markets

摘要

Using manager compensation disclosure and intra-family manager cooperation measures, we create indices of family-level competitive/cooperative incentives. Families that encourage cooperation among their managers are more likely to engage in coordinated behavior (e.g., cross-trading and cross-holding) and have less volatile cash flows. Families with competitive incentives generate higher performing funds, a higher fraction of star funds, but greater performance dispersion across funds. In examining the determinants of incentive schemes, competitive families are more likely to manage institutional money, and cooperative families are more likely to distribute through brokers, consistent with retail demand for nonperformance characteristics. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.