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作者：Boot, Arnoud W. A.; Thakor, Anjan V.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We examine the design of control rights of external financiers, and how these interact with the firm's security issuance and capital structure when the firm's initial owners and managers may disagree with new investors over project choice. The first main result is an ex ante managerial preference for soft financial claims that maximize managerial project-choice autonomy, which is in contrast to agency theory. Second, a dynamic pecking order of cash, equity, and debt emerges. Additional results...
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作者：Baranchuk, Nina; MacDonald, Glenn; Yang, Jun
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：We study a competitive model in which managers differ in ability and choose unobservable effort. Each firm chooses its size, how able a manager is to hire, and managerial compensation. The model can be considered an amalgam of agency and Superstars, where optimizing incentives enhances the firm's ability to provide a talented manager with greater resources. The model delivers many testable implications. Preliminary results show that the model is useful for understanding interesting compensatio...
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作者：Stanton, Richard; Wallace, Nancy
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：During the recent financial crisis, ABX.HE index credit default swaps (CDS) on baskets of mortgage-backed securities were a benchmark widely used by financial institutions to mark their subprime mortgage portfolios to market. However, we find that prices for the AAA ABX.HE index CDS during the crisis were inconsistent with any reasonable assumption for mortgage default rates, and that these price changes are only weakly correlated with observed changes in the credit performance of the underlyi...
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作者：Ayotte, Kenneth; Bolton, Patrick
作者单位：Northwestern University; Columbia University
摘要：This article adopts a definition of property rights from legal scholarship: A property right (in contrast to a contractual right) is enforceable, not only against the parties to a contract, but also against third parties outside the contract. In a financial contracting setting, we ask: When should the law enforce a lender's contractual protections as property rights, given that these rights may be hidden and costly for other lenders to discover? Our model explains why the law limits the creati...
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作者：Agarwal, Vikas; Daniel, Naveen D.; Naik, Narayan Y.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Drexel University
摘要：For funds with high incentives and more opportunities to inflate returns, we find that (i) returns during December are significantly higher than returns during the rest of the year, even after controlling for risk in both the time series and the cross-section; and (ii) this December spike is greater than for funds with lower incentives and fewer opportunities to inflate returns. These results suggest that hedge funds manage their returns upward in an opportunistic fashion in order to earn high...
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作者：Hennessy, Christopher A.; Zechner, Josef
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We analyze determinants of secondary debt market liquidity, identifying conditions under which a large investor can profitably buy stakes from small bondholders and offer unilateral debt relief to a distressed firm. We show that endogenous trading by small bondholders may result in multiple equilibria. Some equilibria entail vanishing liquidity and sharp increases in yields absent changing fundamentals. In turn, anticipation of illiquid equilibria induces firms to eschew public debt financing,...
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作者：Leary, Mark T.; Michaely, Roni
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Reichman University
摘要：We document the cross-sectional properties of corporate dividend-smoothing policies and relate them to extant theories. We find that younger, smaller firms, firms with low dividend yields and more volatile earnings and returns, and firms with fewer and more disperse analyst forecasts smooth less. Firms that are cash cows, with low growth prospects, weaker governance, and greater institutional holdings, smooth more. We also document that dividend smoothing has steadily increased over the past 8...
