Managerial Autonomy, Allocation of Control Rights, and Optimal Capital Structure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boot, Arnoud W. A.; Thakor, Anjan V.
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhr045
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 3434
• 关键词: SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS; STRUCTURE CHOICE; corporate-finance; security design; economic-theory; AGENCY COSTS; debt; cash; issues; STOCK

摘要

We examine the design of control rights of external financiers, and how these interact with the firm's security issuance and capital structure when the firm's initial owners and managers may disagree with new investors over project choice. The first main result is an ex ante managerial preference for soft financial claims that maximize managerial project-choice autonomy, which is in contrast to agency theory. Second, a dynamic pecking order of cash, equity, and debt emerges. Additional results explain equity issuance at high prices, the drifting of leverage ratios with stock returns, cash hoarding, and debt usage without taxes, agency, or signaling.