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作者：Franks, Julian; Mayer, Colin; Volpin, Paolo; Wagner, Hannes F.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; University of Oxford; Bocconi University
摘要：We show that in countries with strong investor protection, developed financial markets, and active markets for corporate control, family firms evolve into widely held companies as they age. In countries with weak investor protection, less developed financial markets, and inactive markets for corporate control, family control is very persistent over time. While family control in high investor protection countries is concentrated in industries that have low investment opportunities and low merge...
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作者：Siegel, Jordan; Choudhury, Prithwiraj
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：One of the most rigorous methodologies in the corporate governance literature uses firms' reactions to industry shocks to characterize the quality of governance. This methodology can produce the wrong answer unless one considers the ways firms compete. Because macro-level shocks reverberate differently at the firm level depending on whether a firm has a cost structure that requires significant adjustment, the quality of governance can only be elucidated accurately analyzing a firm's business s...
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作者：Basak, Suleyman; Chabakauri, Georgy
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We provide fully analytical, optimal dynamic hedges in incomplete markets by employing the traditional minimum-variance criterion. Our hedges are in terms of generalized Greeks and naturally extend no-arbitrage-based risk management in complete markets to incomplete markets. Whereas the literature characterizes either minimum-variance static, myopic, or dynamic hedges from which a hedger may deviate unless able to precommit, our hedges are time-consistent. We apply our results to derivatives r...
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作者：Becker, Bo; Stromberg, Per
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We use an important legal event to examine the effect of managerial fiduciary duties on equity-debt conflicts. A 1991 legal ruling changed corporate directors' fiduciary duties in Delaware firms, limiting managers' incentives to take actions that favor equity over debt for distressed firms. After this, affected firms responded by increasing equity issues and investment and by reducing risk. The ruling was also followed by an increase in leverage, reduced reliance on covenants, and higher value...
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作者：He, Zhiguo; Xiong, Wei
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article analyzes the dynamic coordination problem among creditors of a firm with a time-varying fundamental and a staggered debt structure. In deciding whether to roll over his debt, each maturing creditor is concerned about the rollover decisions of other creditors whose debt matures during his next contract period. We derive a unique threshold equilibrium and characterize the roles of fundamental volatility, credit lines, and debt maturity in driving runs. In particular, we show that wh...
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作者：Denis, David J.; McKeon, Stephen B.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Oregon
摘要：Firms that intentionally increase leverage through substantial debt issuances do so primarily as a response to operating needs rather than a desire to make a large equity payout. Subsequent debt reductions are neither rapid, nor the result of proactive attempts to rebalance the firm's capital structure toward a long-run target. Instead, the evolution of the firm's leverage ratio depends primarily on whether or not the firm produces a financial surplus. In fact, firms that generate subsequent d...
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作者：Nini, Greg; Smith, David C.; Sufi, Amir
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Virginia; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We provide evidence that creditors play an active role in the governance of corporations well outside of payment default states. By examining the Securities and Exchange Commission's filings of all U.S. nonfinancial firms from 1996 through 2008, we document that, in any given year, between 10% and 20% of firms report being in violation of a financial covenant in a credit agreement. We show that violations are followed immediately by a decline in acquisitions and capital expenditures, a sharp r...
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作者：Dicks, David L.
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：This article establishes a role for corporate governance regulation. An externality operating through executive compensation motivates regulation. Governance lowers agency costs, allowing firms to grant less incentive pay. When a firm increases governance and lowers incentive pay, other firms can also lower executive compensation. Because firms do not internalize the full benefit of governance, regulation can improve investor welfare. When regulation is enforced, large firms increase in value,...
