The Life Cycle of Family Ownership: International Evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Franks, Julian; Mayer, Colin; Volpin, Paolo; Wagner, Hannes F.
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; University of Oxford; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhr135
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1675
• 关键词: corporate-ownership; firm; EVOLUTION; IMPACT; LAW; IPO

摘要

We show that in countries with strong investor protection, developed financial markets, and active markets for corporate control, family firms evolve into widely held companies as they age. In countries with weak investor protection, less developed financial markets, and inactive markets for corporate control, family control is very persistent over time. While family control in high investor protection countries is concentrated in industries that have low investment opportunities and low merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, the same is not so in countries that have low investor protection, where the presence of family control in an industry is unrelated to investment opportunities and M&A activity.