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作者：Ben-David, Itzhak; Hirshleifer, David
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We examine how investor preferences and beliefs affect trading in relation to past gains and losses. The probability of selling as a function of profit is V-shaped; at short holding periods, investors are more likely to sell big losers than small ones. There is little evidence of an upward jump in selling at zero profits. These findings provide no clear indication that realization preference explains trading. Furthermore, the disposition effect is not driven by a simple direct preference for s...
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作者：Dam, Lammertjan; Koetter, Michael
作者单位：University of Groningen
摘要：We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout expectations on bank risk, we exploit the fact that regional political factors explain bank bailouts but not bank risk. The sample includes all observed capital preservation measures and distressed exits in the German banking industry during 1995-2006. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviatio...
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作者：Pool, Veronika K.; Stoffman, Noah; Yonker, Scott E.
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：We show that familiarity affects the portfolio decisions of mutual fund managers. Controlling for fund location, funds overweight stocks from their managers' home states by 12% compared with their peers. In team-managed funds, home-state overweighting is 37% larger than the fund location effect. The home-state bias is stronger if the manager is inexperienced, is resource-constrained, or spent more time in his home state. Home-state stocks do not outperform other holdings, confirming that home-...
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作者：Chalmers, John; Reuter, Jonathan
作者单位：Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Oregon
摘要：Because life annuities can increase the level and decrease the volatility of lifetime consumption, economists have long been puzzled by the low demand for life annuities. One potential rational explanation is that adverse selection drives up life annuity prices, which drives down demand. We study the choice between life annuities and lump sums made by 32,000 retiring public employees. These unique data allow us to extend the existing literature by exploiting economically significant cross-sect...
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作者：Duarte, Jefferson; Siegel, Stephan; Young, Lance
作者单位：Rice University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Although it is well known that appearance-based impressions affect labor market and election outcomes, little is known about the role appearance plays in financial transactions. We address this question using photographs of potential borrowers from a peer-to-peer lending site. Consistent with the trust-intensive nature of lending, we find that borrowers who appear more trustworthy have higher probabilities of having their loans funded. Moreover, borrowers who appear more trustworthy indeed hav...
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作者：Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; University of Naples Federico II
摘要：We present a model in which issuers of asset-backed securities choose to release coarse information to enhance the liquidity of their primary market, at the cost of reducing secondary market liquidity. The degree of transparency is inefficiently low if the social value of secondary market liquidity exceeds its private value. We show that various types of public intervention (mandatory transparency standards, provision of liquidity to distressed banks, or secondary market price support) have qu...
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作者：Heider, Florian; Inderst, Roman
作者单位：European Central Bank; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We analyze corporate lending when loan officers must be incentivized to prospect for loans and to transmit the soft information they obtain in that process. We explore how this multi-task agency problem shapes loan officers' compensation, banks' use of soft information in credit approval, and their lending standards. When competition intensifies, prospecting for loans becomes more important and banks' internal agency problems worsen. In response to more competition, banks lower lending standar...
