Loan Prospecting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heider, Florian; Inderst, Roman
• 署名单位: European Central Bank; Goethe University Frankfurt
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhs051
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 2381
• 关键词: CREDIT AVAILABILITY; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; selection; RISK

摘要

We analyze corporate lending when loan officers must be incentivized to prospect for loans and to transmit the soft information they obtain in that process. We explore how this multi-task agency problem shapes loan officers' compensation, banks' use of soft information in credit approval, and their lending standards. When competition intensifies, prospecting for loans becomes more important and banks' internal agency problems worsen. In response to more competition, banks lower lending standards, may choose to disregard soft and use only hard information in their credit approval, and in that case reduce loan officers to salespeople with steep, volume-based compensation. Our model generates excessive lending as banks' optimal response to an internal agency problem.