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作者：Tantri, Prasanna L.
作者单位：Indian School of Business (ISB)
摘要：Using an unexpected government regulation that restricted the ability of microfinance institutions to recover loans in one Indian state, I examine whether this intervention affected bank loan performance. The bank loan delinquency rate significantly increased as a result. In response, the ex post bank credit supply declined by more than half. For identification, I compare loans from branches located in regions subject to this intervention with loans from nearby branches of the same bank locate...
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作者：Edmans, Alex; Goncalves-Pinto, Luis; Groen-Xu, Moqi; Wang, Yanbo
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London Business School; Chinese University of Hong Kong; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：We find that CEOs release 20% more discretionary news items in months in which they are expected to sell equity, predicted using scheduled vesting months. These vesting months are determined by equity grants made several years prior and thus unlikely to be driven by the current information environment. The increase arises for positive news, but not neutral or negative news, nor nondiscretionary news. News releases fall in the month before and month after the vesting month. News in vesting mont...
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作者：Morellec, Erwan; Nikolov, Boris; Schurhoff, Norman
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); University of Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI)
摘要：We construct firm-level indexes for agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside investors by estimating a dynamic model of financing decisions. Our estimates for 12,652 firms from 14 countries show that agency conflicts are large and highly variable across firms and countries. Differences in agency conflicts are largely due to differences in firm-level governance, ownership concentration, and other firm characteristics. The origin of law is more relevant for curtailing govern...
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作者：Olafsson, Arna; Pagel, Michaela
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We use a very accurate panel of all individual spending, income, balances, and credit limits from a personal finance software to document spending responses to the arrival of both regular and irregular income. These payday responses are robust and homogeneous for all income and spending categories throughout the income distribution. Moreover, we find that few people hold little or no liquidity. We then analyze whether people hold liquidity cushions to cope with future liquidity constraints. Ho...
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作者：Dasgupta, Sudipto; Li, Xi; Wang, Albert Y.
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Lancaster University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; Auburn University System; Auburn University
摘要：We examine the effect of competition shocks induced by major industry-level tariff cuts on forced CEO turnover. Both the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and its sensitivity to performance increase. These effects are stronger for firms exposed to greater predation risk and with products more similar to those of other firms. CEOs are more likely to be forced out in weak governance firms; however, in good governance firms, CEOs are offered higher incentive pay. New outside CEOs receive higher i...
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作者：Jochem, Torsten; Ladika, Tomislav; Sautner, Zacharias
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
摘要：We document that firms can effectively retain executives by granting deferred equity pay. We show this by analyzing a unique regulatory change (FAS 123-R) that prompted 723 firms to suddenly eliminate stock option vesting periods. This allowed CEOs to keep 33% more options when departing the firm, and we find that voluntary CEO departure rates subsequently rose from 5% to 21%. Our identification strategy exploits FAS 123-R's almost-random timing, which was staggered by firms' fiscal year-ends....
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作者：Pasquariello, Paolo
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作者：Graham, John R.; Leary, Mark T.
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We study time-series and cross-firm variation in corporate cash holdings from 1920 to 2014. The recent increase in cash is not unique in magnitude. However, the recent divergence between average and aggregate cash is new and entirely driven by a shift in cash policies of newly public firms, whereas within-firm changes have been negative or flat since the 1940s. Cross-sectional relations between cash holdings and firm characteristics are stable throughout the century, though characteristics exp...
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作者：Hoechle, Daniel; Ruenzi, Stefan; Schaub, Nic; Schmid, Markus
作者单位：FHNW University of Applied Sciences & Arts Northwestern Switzerland; University of Mannheim; University of St Gallen
摘要：We use a unique data set from a large retail bank containing internal managerial accounting data on revenues and costs per client to analyze how banks and their financial advisors generate profits with customers. We find that advised transactions are associated with higher profits than independently executed trades of the same client. The bank's own mutual funds and structured products are most profitable for the bank, and profits increase with trade size. We show that advisors recommend exact...
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作者：Danisewicz, Piotr; McGowan, Danny; Onali, Enrico; Schaeck, Klaus
作者单位：University of Bristol; University of Nottingham; Aston University
摘要：We examine how debt priority structure affects bank funding costs and soundness. Leveraging an unexplored natural experiment that changes the priority of claims on banks' assets, we document asymmetric effects that are consistent with changes in monitoring intensity by various creditors depending on whether creditors move up or down the priority ladder. The enactment of depositor preference laws that confer priority on depositors reduces deposit rates but increases nondeposit rates. Importantl...
