Agency Conflicts around the World

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morellec, Erwan; Nikolov, Boris; Schurhoff, Norman
• 署名单位: Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); University of Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhy018
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 4232
• 关键词: dynamic capital structure; MANAGERIAL DISCRETION; corporate governance; Investor protection; Financial distress; private benefits; Debt enforcement; STRUCTURE CHOICE; credit spreads; cash flow

摘要

We construct firm-level indexes for agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside investors by estimating a dynamic model of financing decisions. Our estimates for 12,652 firms from 14 countries show that agency conflicts are large and highly variable across firms and countries. Differences in agency conflicts are largely due to differences in firm-level governance, ownership concentration, and other firm characteristics. The origin of law is more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than for guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally between wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions. Recent governance reforms in Europe have significantly reduced agency costs.