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作者:Eshel, I; Samuelson, L; Shaked, A
作者单位:Tel Aviv University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Bonn
摘要:We study a population of agents, each of whom can be an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruism is a strictly dominated strategy. Agents choose their actions by imitating others who earn high payoffs. Interactions between agents are local, so that each agent affects (and is affected by) only his neighbors. Altruists can survive in such a world if they are grouped together, so that the benefits of altruism are enjoyed primarily by other Altruists, who then earn relatively high payoffs and are imitated....
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作者:Hermalin, BE; Weisbach, MS
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Arizona
摘要:How can boards be chosen through a process partially controlled by the CEO, yet, in many instances, still be effective monitors of him? We offer an answer based on a model in which board effectiveness is a function of its independence. This, in turn, is a function of negotiations (implicit or explicit) between existing directors and the CEO over who will fill vacancies on the board. The CEO's bargaining power over the board-selection process comes from his perceived ability relative to potenti...
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作者:Brander, JA; Taylor, MS
作者单位:University of British Columbia; University of British Columbia
摘要:This paper presents a general equilibrium model of renewable resource and population dynamics related to the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model, with man as the predator and the resource base as the prey. We apply the model to the rise and fall of Easter Island, showing that plausible parameter values generate a 'feast and famine pattern of cyclical adjustment in population and resource stocks. Near-monotonic adjustment arises for higher values of a resource regeneration parameter, as might ap...
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作者:Zucker, LG; Darby, MR; Brewer, MB
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
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作者:Harberger, AC
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles