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作者：Levin, J
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper studies the design of self-enforced relational contracts. I show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form, but that self-enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision. With hidden information, it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditi...
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作者：Rauch, JE; Trindade, V
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Syracuse University
摘要：Improved information allows home firms to rule out more potential foreign trade partners in advance of attempting to form a match. The increased responsiveness to country wage or goods price differentials resulting from this better first cut causes the general-equilibrium elasticity of substitution between national labor forces or the Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported output to increase. Further results include an increase in the elasticity of domestic labor de...
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作者：McCullough, BD; Vinod, HD
作者单位：Drexel University; Drexel University; Fordham University
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作者：Wang, N
作者单位：University of Rochester
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作者：Phillips, OR; Menkhaus, DJ; Coatney, KT
作者单位：University of Wyoming; University of Wyoming; United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
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作者：Segal, I
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The standard profit-maximizing multiunit auction intersects the submitted demand curve with a preset reservation supply curve, which is determined using the distribution from which the buyers' valuations are drawn. However, when this distribution is unknown, a preset supply curve cannot maximize monopoly profits. The optimal pricing mechanism in this situation sets a price for each buyer on the basis of the demand distribution inferred statistically from other buyers' bids. The resulting profi...
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作者：Levin, A; Wieland, V; Williams, JC
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We investigate the performance of forecast-based monetary policy rules using five macroeconomic models that reflect a wide range of views on aggregate dynamics. We identify the key characteristics of rules that are robust to model uncertainty; such rules respond to the one-year-ahead inflation forecast and to the current output gap and incorporate a substantial degree of policy inertia. In contrast, rules with longer forecast horizons are less robust and are prone to generating indeterminacy. ...
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作者：Smith, VL
作者单位：George Mason University
