2003

最新文章

• Modern theory of unemployment fluctuations: Empirics and policy applications AI翻译
  作者：Hall, RE
  作者单位：Stanford University
• Access to food and the biological standard of living: Perspectives on the nutritional status of native Americans AI翻译
  作者：Komlos, J
  作者单位：University of Munich
• Organizational design and technology choice under intrafirm bargaining: Reply AI翻译
  作者：Stole, LA; Zwiebel, J
  作者单位：University of Chicago; Stanford University
• Energy, the stock market, and the putty-clay investment model AI翻译
  作者：Wei, C
  作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• On the evolution of the firm size distribution: Facts and theory AI翻译
  作者：Cabral, LMB; Mata, J
  作者单位：New York University; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
  摘要：Using a comprehensive data set of Portuguese manufacturing firms, we show that the firm size distribution is significantly right-skewed, evolving over time toward a lognormal distribution. We also show that selection accounts for very little of this evolution. Instead, we propose a simple theory based on financing constraints. A calibrated version of our model does a good job at explaining the evolution of the firm size distribution.
• Upward bias in the estimated returns to education: Evidence from South Africa AI翻译
  作者：Hertz, T
  作者单位：American University
• To float or to fix: Evidence on the impact of exchange rate regimes on growth AI翻译
  作者：Levy-Yeyati, E; Sturzenegger, F
  摘要：We study the relationship between exchange rate regimes and economic growth for a sample of 183 countries over the post-Bretton Woods period, using a new de facto classification of regimes based on the actual behavior of the relevant macroeconomic variables. In contrast with previous studies, we find that, for developing countries, less flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with slower growth, as well as with greater output volatility. For industrial countries, regimes do not appear to...
• Relational incentive contracts AI翻译
  作者：Levin, J
  作者单位：Stanford University
  摘要：Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper studies the design of self-enforced relational contracts. I show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form, but that self-enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision. With hidden information, it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditi...
• Inter-asset differences in effective estate-tax burdens AI翻译
  作者：Poterba, JM; Weisbenner, SJ
  作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• Reinsuring risk to increase access to health insurance AI翻译
  作者：Swartz, K
  作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard Medical School