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作者：Wasmer, E; Weil, P
作者单位：University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal; Universite de Lorraine
摘要：Credit market imperfections influence the labor market and aggregate economic activity. In turn, macroeconomic factors have an impact on the credit sector. To assess these effects in a tractable general-equilibrium framework, we introduce endogenous search frictions, in the spirit of Peter Diamond (1990), in both credit and labor markets. We demonstrate that credit frictions amplify macroeconomic volatility through a financial accelerator. The magnitude of this general-equilibrium accelerator ...
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作者：Burnside, C; Dollar, D
作者单位：Duke University; The World Bank
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作者：Mailath, GJ; Postlewatte, A; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study transactions that require investments before trading in a competitive market, when forward contracts fixing the transaction price are absent. We show that, despite the market being perfectly competitive and subject to arbitrarily little uncertainty, the inability to jointly determine investment levels and prices may make it impossible for buyers and sellers to predict the prices at which they will trade, leading to inefficient levels of investment and trade.
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作者：Garicano, L; Santos, T
作者单位：University of Chicago; Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Columbia University
摘要：This paper studies the matching of opportunities with talent when costly diagnosis confers an informational advantage to the agent undertaking it. When this agent is underqualified, adverse selection prevents efficient referrals through fixed-price contracts. Spot-market contracts that rely on income sharing can match opportunities with talent but induce a team-production problem which, if severe enough, can prevent the referral of valuable opportunities. Partnership contracts, in which agents...
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作者：Bertrand, M; Mullainathan, S; Shafir, E
作者单位：University of Chicago; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Princeton University
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作者：Azoulay, P
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：How do firm boundaries influence employees' acquisition of information? Using detailed project-level data and qualitative evidence, I document that pharmaceutical firms are more likely to outsource the coordination of data-intensive clinical trials, while they are more likely to assign knowledge-intensive trials to internal teams. Managers do not choose between market and hierarchy, but between the hierarchy of the firm-in which subjective performance evaluations are combined with flat explici...
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作者：Sala-I-Martin, X; Doppelhofer, G; Miller, RI
作者单位：Columbia University; Pompeu Fabra University; University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper examines the robustness of explanatory variables in cross-country economic growth regressions. It introduces and employs a novel approach, Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE), which constructs estimates by averaging OLS coefficients across models. The weights given to individual regressions have a Bayesian justification similar to the Schwarz model selection criterion. Of 67 explanatory variables we find 18 to be significantly and robustly partially correlated with long...
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作者：Somerville, RA
作者单位：Trinity College Dublin
摘要：This paper shows how the demand for non-life insurance interacts with consumption and saving. The analysis is set in continuous time, using the maximum principle. When insurance is actuarially fair, the insurance and consumption decisions are separable. With loaded premiums, and alternatively without insurance, optimal consumption is dynamically related to the growth rate of the loss probability, and a growing loss probability generates precautionary saving. With loaded premiums, less than ful...
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作者：Murphy, KJ; Zábojník, J
作者单位：University of Southern California
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作者：Van Den Steen, E
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Rational agents with differing priors tend to be overoptimistic about their chances of success. In particular, an agent who tries to choose the action that is most likely to succeed, is more likely to choose an action of which he overestimated, rather than underestimated, the likelihood of success. After studying the comparative statics of this mechanism, I show that it also causes agents to attribute failure to exogenous factors but success to their own choice of action, to disproportionately...
