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作者:Dow, J; Gorton, G; Krishnamurthy, A
作者单位:University of London; London Business School; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University
摘要:We integrate a widely accepted version of the separation of ownership and control-Michael Jensen's (1986)free cash flow theory-into a dynamic equilibrium model, and study the effect of imperfect corporate control on asset prices and investment. Aggregate free cash flow of the corporate sector is an important state variable in explaining asset prices, investment, and the cyclical behavior of interest rates and the yield curve. The financial friction causes cash-flow shocks to affect investment,...
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作者:Saez, E; Veall, MR
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley; McMaster University; McMaster University
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作者:Cooper, DJ; Kagel, JH
作者单位:University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要:We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding truth-wins norm. The superior performance of teams is most striking following changes in payoffs that change the equilibrium outcome. Individuals play less strategically following the change in payoffs than inexperienced subjects playing the same game. In contrast, the teams exhibit p...
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作者:Iacoviello, M
作者单位:Boston College
摘要:I develop and estimate a monetary business cycle model with nominal loans and collateral constraints tied to housing values. Demand shocks move housing and nominal prices in the same direction, and are amplified and propagated over time. The financial accelerator is not uniform: nominal debt dampens supply shocks, stabilizing the economy under interest rate control. Structural estimation supports two key model features: collateral effects dramatically improve the response of aggregate demand t...
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作者:Saint-Paul, G
作者单位:Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要:This paper shows that price rigidity evolves in an economy populated by imperfectly rational agents who experiment with alternative rules of thumb. In the model, firms must set their prices in face of aggregate demand shocks. Their payoff depends on the level of aggregate demand, as well as on their own price and their neighbor's price. The latter assumption captures local interactions. Despite the fact that the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is characterized by a simple pricing rule ...