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作者：Korteweg, Arthur; Nagel, Stefan
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：This paper introduces a new metric, alpha, to benchmark the performance of individual private equity funds. Our metric is substantially less sensitive to noise in fund cash flows compared to the popular public market equivalent (PME) and its generalization (GPME), while having the same aggregate pricing implications as GPME. For a large data set of fund cash flows, alpha estimates have much lower standard deviation across funds than does (G)PME. For buyout funds, PME and alpha are close, but d...
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作者：Bellon, Aymeric
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine
摘要：This paper shows that private equity (PE) ownership, in private-to-private buyouts, leads to a reduction in pollution when the target company faces high potential liabilities for polluting. Conversely, PE-backed firms increase pollution when environmental liability risks are low, as shown by a novel natural experiment that reduced these risks for projects located on federal land. Exploiting specific PE deals within the energy industry, I find that PE governance is the main driver of the result...
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作者：Bourveau, Thomas; Breuer, Matthias; Stoumbos, Robert
作者单位：University of Oxford; Goethe University Frankfurt; ESSEC Business School
摘要：We study the influence of bounded rationality on companies' disclosure to investors in new industries. Using a historical example of a new industry, we document that several companies initially withheld their earnings, despite external capital needs and investor information demands. However, almost all these companies started disclosing shortly thereafter. Interpreted through the lens of a disclosure model featuring level-$ k $ thinking, these patterns suggest that limited strategic thinking o...
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作者：Engelberg, Joseph; Lu, Runjing; Mullins, William; Townsend, Richard
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Toronto; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We document political sentiment effects on U.S. inventors. Democratic inventors are more likely to patent (relative to Republicans) after the 2008 election of Obama but less likely after the 2016 election of Trump. These effects are at least twice as strong among politically active Democrats and are present even within firms and within firm$ \times $technology. We also show that partisans tend to cluster in technologies (e.g., Democrats in Biotechnology and Republicans in Weapons), so that sen...
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作者：Clayton, Christopher; Schaab, Andreas
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We develop a tractable dynamic contracting framework to study bank bail-in regimes. In the presence of a repeated monitoring problem, the optimal bank capital structure combines standard debt, which induces liquidation and provides strong incentives, and bail-in debt, which restores solvency but provides weaker incentives. Given fire sales, an optimal policy response entails joint regulation: a bail-in regime reduces standard debt while leverage regulation reduces total debt. Bail-ins replace ...
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作者：Garfinkel, Jon A.; Hammoudeh, Mosab
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Louisiana System; University of New Orleans
摘要：We offer new evidence on the relationship between competition and innovation that overcomes two measurement difficulties compromising the extant literature: aggregation at either firm level (or higher) of innovative activity, and the mediating influence of distance-to-technological-frontier. FDA awards of Breakthrough Therapy Designations (BTDs) on specific drugs, instrument stochastic unleveling of therapeutic (ie, product) markets. Rivals' innovative responses generally show an inverted-U pa...
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作者：Rehbein, Oliver; Rother, Simon
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of Mannheim
摘要：We present evidence that loan allocations and loan terms are closely linked to the strength of social connections between bank and borrower regions. Lending increases with social connectedness, particularly in the presence of strong screening incentives. If connectedness is high, banks discriminate between borrowers more, the terms of originated loans are more borrower friendly, and loan performance is better. Furthermore, social connectedness is associated with higher bank profitability and w...
