Bail-Ins, Optimal Regulation, and Crisis Resolution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Clayton, Christopher; Schaab, Andreas
• 署名单位: Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaf002
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 2810
• 关键词: Financial intermediation; security design; continuous-time; moral hazard; liquidity; debt; banking; FIRMS; RISK

摘要

We develop a tractable dynamic contracting framework to study bank bail-in regimes. In the presence of a repeated monitoring problem, the optimal bank capital structure combines standard debt, which induces liquidation and provides strong incentives, and bail-in debt, which restores solvency but provides weaker incentives. Given fire sales, an optimal policy response entails joint regulation: a bail-in regime reduces standard debt while leverage regulation reduces total debt. Bail-ins replace bailouts as a recapitalization tool.