Institution Formation in Public Goods Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kosfeld, Michael; Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno
• 署名单位: Goethe University Frankfurt; Hitotsubashi University; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1335
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1335-1355
• 关键词: punishment; RECIPROCITY; provision; mechanism; fairness; COOPERATION; COMPETITION; allocation; SANCTIONS; ECONOMICS

摘要

Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed and that it positively affects cooperation and group welfare. However, the data also shows that success is not guaranteed. Players are unwilling to implement equilibrium institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. Our results emphasize the role of fairness in the institution formation process. (JEL C72, D02, H41)