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作者：Custodio, Claudia; Metzger, Daniel
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This paper shows how chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics affect the performance of acquirers in diversifying takeovers. When the acquirer's CEO has previous experience in the target industry, the acquirer's abnormal announcement returns are between 1.2 and 2.0 percentage points larger than those generated by a CEO who is new to the target industry. This outcome is driven by the industryexpert CEO's ability to capture a larger fraction of the merger surplus. Industryexpert CEOs typica...
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作者：Fernandes, Nuno; Ferreira, Miguel A.; Matos, Pedro; Murphy, Kevin J.
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa; University of Virginia; University of Southern California
摘要：This paper challenges the widely accepted stylized fact that chief executive officers (CEOs) in the United States are paid significantly more than their foreign counterparts. Using CEO pay data across fourteen countries with mandated pay disclosures, we show that the U.S. pay premium is economically modest and primarily reflects the performance-based pay demanded by institutional shareholders and independent boards. Indeed, we find no significant difference in either level of CEO pay or the us...
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作者：Repullo, Rafael; Suarez, Javier
摘要：We compare various bank capital regulation regimes using a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period and the business cycle determines loans' probabilities of default. Banks hold endogenous capital buffers as a precaution against shocks that impair their future lending capacity. We find that Basel II is more procyclical than Basel I but makes banks safer, and it is generally superior in welfare terms. For high social c...
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作者：Lerner, Josh; Malmendier, Ulrike
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：How do individuals decide to become entrepreneurs and learn to make optimal entrepreneurial decisions? The concentration of entrepreneurs in regions such as Silicon Valley has stimulated research and policy interest into the influence of peers, but the causal effect is hard to identify empirically. We exploit the exogenous assignment of students into business-school sections to identify the causal effect of entrepreneurial peers. We show that, in contrast to prior findings, a higher share of e...
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作者：Garmaise, Mark J.
摘要：A mortgage program that offered borrowers greater flexibility in the timing of repayments increased a bank's volume by over 35%. Loans in the program exhibited superior performance. Despite this, a regression discontinuity analysis shows that the causal impact of offering flexibility was to attract borrowers to the bank who experienced quadruple the average delinquency rate. These contrasting findings are driven by the fact that the bank engaged in ex post sorting of stronger borrowers into th...
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作者：Griffin, John M.; Nickerson, Jordan; Tang, Dragon Yongjun
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We examine whether rating shopping or rating catering is a more accurate characterization of rating agency interactions regarding collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Although investors paid a premium for dual ratings, AAA CDO tranches rated by both Moody's and S&P defaulted more frequently than tranches rated by only one of them, which is inconsistent with pure rating shopping. Rating agencies made upward adjustments beyond their model when their competitor had more lenient assumptions. Fi...
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作者：Engelberg, Joseph; Gao, Pengjie; Parsons, Christopher A.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Notre Dame
摘要：CEOs with large networks earn more than those with small networks. An additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases compensation by about $17,000 on average, more so for important members, such as CEOs of big firms. Pay-for-connectivity is unrelated to several measures of corporate governance, evidence in favor of an efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay.
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作者：Banal-Estanol, Albert; Ottaviani, Marco; Winton, Andrerw
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Bocconi University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：This paper characterizes when joint financing of two projects through debt increases expected default costs, contrary to conventional wisdom. Separate financing dominates joint financing when risk-contamination losses-that are associated with the contagious default of a well-performing project that is dragged down by the other project's poor performance-outweigh standard coinsurance gains. Separate financing becomes more attractive than joint financing when the fraction of returns lost under d...
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作者：Gaul, Lewis; Uysal, Pinar
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
摘要：This paper examines whether unobservable differences in firm volatility are responsible for the global loan pricing puzzle, which is the observation that corporate loan interest rates appear to be lower in Europe than in the United States. We analyze whether equity volatility, an error prone measure of firm volatility, can explain this difference in loan spreads. We show that using equity volatility in OLS regressions will result in biased and inconsistent estimates of the difference in U.S. a...
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作者：Kogan, Leonid; Papanikolaou, Dimitris
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Average return differences among firms sorted on valuation ratios, past investment, profitability, market beta, or idiosyncratic volatility are largely driven by differences in exposures of firms to the same systematic factor related to embodied technology shocks. Using a calibrated structural model, we show that these firm characteristics are correlated with the ratio of growth opportunities to firm value, which affects firms' exposures to capital-embodied productivity shocks and risk premia....
