The Price of a CEO's Rolodex

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engelberg, Joseph; Gao, Pengjie; Parsons, Christopher A.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Notre Dame
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhs114
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 79
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INVESTMENT; STOCK; connections; networking; matters; BIAS; pay

摘要

CEOs with large networks earn more than those with small networks. An additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases compensation by about $17,000 on average, more so for important members, such as CEOs of big firms. Pay-for-connectivity is unrelated to several measures of corporate governance, evidence in favor of an efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay.