Are U.S. CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fernandes, Nuno; Ferreira, Miguel A.; Matos, Pedro; Murphy, Kevin J.
• 署名单位: Universidade Nova de Lisboa; University of Virginia; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhs122
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 323
• 关键词: firm performance; executive-compensation; corporate governance; institutional investors; pay; RISK; OWNERSHIP; ECONOMICS; options; size

摘要

This paper challenges the widely accepted stylized fact that chief executive officers (CEOs) in the United States are paid significantly more than their foreign counterparts. Using CEO pay data across fourteen countries with mandated pay disclosures, we show that the U.S. pay premium is economically modest and primarily reflects the performance-based pay demanded by institutional shareholders and independent boards. Indeed, we find no significant difference in either level of CEO pay or the use of equity-based pay between U.S. and non-U.S. firms exposed to international and U.S. capital, product, and labor markets. We also show that U.S. and non-U.S. CEO pay has largely converged in the 2000s.