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作者：Bartling, Bjoern; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M.
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Munich
摘要：High-performance work systems give workers more discretion, thereby increasing effort productivity but also shirking opportunities. We show experimentally that screening for work attitude and labor market competition are causal determinants of the viability of high-performance work systems, and we identify the complementarities between discretion, rent-sharing, and screening that render them profitable. Two fundamentally distinct job designs emerge endogenously in our experiments: bad jobs wit...
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作者：Kirchler, Michael; Huber, Juergen; Stoeckl, Thomas
作者单位：University of Innsbruck; University of Gothenburg
摘要：To explore why bubbles frequently emerge in the experimental asset market model of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), we vary the fundamental value process (constant or declining) and the cash-to-asset value ratio (constant or increasing). We observe high mispricing in treatments with a declining fundamental value, while overvaluation emerges when coupled with an increasing C/A ratio. A questionnaire reveals that the declining fundamental value process confuses subjects, as they expect the ...
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作者：Bar-Isaac, Heski; Caruana, Guillermo; Cunat, Vicente
作者单位：New York University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
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作者：Halac, Marina
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：This article studies optimal relational contracts when the value of the relationship between contracting parties is not commonly known. I consider a principal-agent setting where the principal has persistent private information about her outside option. I show that if the principal has the bargaining power, she wants to understate her outside option to provide strong incentives and then renege on promised payments, while if the uninformed agent has the bargaining power, the principal wants to ...
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作者：Herold, Florian
作者单位：Otto Friedrich University Bamberg
摘要：We study the evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity: the willingness to reward and the willingness to punish. First, both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive provided that individuals interact within separate groups. Second, rewarders survive only in coexistence with self-interested preferences, but punishers either vanish or dominate the population entirely. Third, the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishi...
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作者：Inderst, Roman; Ottaviani, Marco
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：In markets for retail financial products and health services, consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs. Product providers, in turn, compete to influence the intermediaries' advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions. Motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices, we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint. The model highlights th...
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作者：Fowlie, Meredith; Holland, Stephen P.; Mansur, Erin T.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Greensboro; Dartmouth College
摘要：An advantage of cap-and-trade programs over more prescriptive environmental regulation is that compliance flexibility and cost effectiveness can make more stringent emissions reductions politically feasible. However, when markets (versus regulators) determine where emissions occur, it becomes more difficult to assure that mandated emissions reductions are equitably achieved. We investigate these issues in the context of Southern California's RECLAIM program by matching facilities in RECLAIM wi...
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作者：Schularick, Moritz; Taylor, Alan M.
作者单位：Free University of Berlin; University of Virginia
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作者：Voors, Maarten J.; Nillesen, Eleonora E. M.; Verwimp, Philip; Bulte, Erwin H.; Lensink, Robert; Van Soest, Daan P.
作者单位：Wageningen University & Research; University of Cambridge; Solvay SA; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Tilburg University; University of Groningen; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tilburg University
摘要：We use a series of field experiments in rural Burundi to examine the impact of exposure to conflict on social, risk, and time preferences. We find that conflict affects behavior: individuals exposed to violence display more altruistic behavior towards their neighbors, are more risk-seeking, and have higher discount rates. Large adverse shocks can thus alter savings and investments decisions, and potentially have long-run consequences-even if the shocks themselves are temporary. (JEL C93, D12, ...
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作者：Almas, Ingvild
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
