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作者：Chava, Sudheer; Danis, Andras; Hsu, Alex
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：We analyze the economic and financial impact of right-to-work (RTW) laws in the US. Using data from collective bargaining agreements, we show that there is a decrease in wages for unionized workers after RTW laws. Firms increase investment and employment but reduce financial leverage. Labor-intensive firms experience higher profits and labor-to-asset ratios. Dividends and executive compensation also increase post-RTW. Our results are consistent with a canonical theory of the firm augmented wit...
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作者：Evans, Richard Burtis; Prado, Melissa Porras; Zambrana, Rafael
作者单位：University of Virginia; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：Using manager compensation disclosure and intra-family manager cooperation measures, we create indices of family-level competitive/cooperative incentives. Families that encourage cooperation among their managers are more likely to engage in coordinated behavior (e.g., cross-trading and cross-holding) and have less volatile cash flows. Families with competitive incentives generate higher performing funds, a higher fraction of star funds, but greater performance dispersion across funds. In exami...
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作者：Cujean, Julien
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Bern
摘要：I develop an equilibrium model to explain why few mutual fund managers consistently outperform, even though many have strong informational advantages. The key ingredient is that managers obtain investment ideas through idea sharing. Idea sharing improves statistical significance of alpha through increased price informativeness. But it also causes better informed managers to take larger positions, which makes their alpha noisier although a significant fraction of managers builds strong informat...
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作者：Gonzalez-Uribe, Juanita
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：I explore the prevalence of exchanges of innovation resources inside venture capital portfolios. I show that after companies join investors' portfolios, several proxies of exchanges between them and portfolio companies (relative to matched nonportfolio companies) increase by an average of 60%. The increase holds when joining events are plausibly exogenous and when VCs' bargaining power and potential conflicts of interest are low. Three novel mechanisms are supported: carve-outs, spawning, and ...
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作者：Chen, Yong; Kelly, Bryan; Wu, Wei
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study how sophisticated investors, when faced with shocks to information environ-ment, change their information acquisition and trading behavior, and how these changes in turn affect market efficiency. We find that, after exogenous reductions of analyst coverage due to closures and mergers of brokerage firms, hedge funds scale up information acquisition, trade more aggressively, and earn higher abnormal returns on the affected stocks. The hedge fund participation also mitigates the impairme...
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作者：Kowaleski, Zachary T.; Sutherland, Andrew G.; Vetter, Felix W.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study the consequences of a 2010 change in the investment adviser qualification exam that reallocated coverage from the rules and ethics section to the technical material section. Comparing advisers with the same employer in the same location and year, we find those passing the exam with more rules and ethics coverage are one-fourth less likely to commit misconduct. The exam change appears to affect advisers' perception of acceptable conduct and not just their awareness of specific rules or...
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作者：Donaldson, Jason Roderick; Gromb, Denis; Piacentino, Giorgia
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a model in which collateral serves to protect creditors from the claims of other creditors. We find that, paradoxically, borrowers rely most on collateral when pledgeability is high. This is when taking on new debt is easy, which dilutes existing creditors. Creditors thus require collateral for protection against possible dilution by collateralized debt. There is a collateral rat race. But collateralized borrowing has a cost: it encumbers assets, constraining future borrowing and in...
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作者：Chen, Zhuo; He, Zhiguo; Liu, Chun
作者单位：Tsinghua University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Tsinghua University
摘要：The upsurge of shadow banking is typically driven by rising financing demand from certain real sectors. In China, the 4 trillion yuan stimulus package in 2009 was behind the rapid growth of shadow banking after 2012, expediting the development of Chinese corporate bond markets in the poststimulus period. Chinese local governments financed the stimulus through bank loans in 2009 and then resorted to nonbank debt financing after 2012 when faced with rollover pressure from bank debt coming due. C...
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作者：Atilgan, Yigit; Bali, Turan G.; Demirtas, K. Ozgur; Gunaydin, A. Doruk
作者单位：Sabanci University; Georgetown University
摘要：This paper documents a significantly negative cross-sectional relation between left-tail risk and future returns on individual stocks trading in the US and international countries. We provide a behavioral explanation to this anomaly based on the idea that investors underestimate the persistence in left-tail risk and overprice stocks with large recent losses. Thus, low returns in the left-tail of the distribution persist into the future causing left-tail return momentum. We find that the left-t...
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作者：Ewens, Michael; Townsend, Richard R.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We study whether early stage investors have gender biases using a proprietary data set from AngelList that allows us to observe private interactions between investors and fundraising startups. We find that male investors express less interest in female entrepreneurs compared to observably similar male entrepreneurs. In contrast, female investors express more interest in female entrepreneurs. These findings do not appear to be driven by within-gender screening/monitoring advantages or gender di...
