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作者：Burch, TR; Nanda, V; Warther, V
作者单位：University of Miami; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We examine underwriting fees for repeat issuers of new securities to determine the relation between loyalty to an underwriting bank and the fees charged. For a sample of offers over the 1975-2001 period, we find that loyalty is associated with lower fees for common stock offers, consistent with valuable relationship capital being built through loyalty. For debt offers, however, we find the opposite pattern, consistent with relationship capital not being as valuable. For both offer types, firms...
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作者：Christoffersen, SEK; Géczy, CC; Musto, DK; Reed, AV
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; McGill University; Universite de Montreal; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We consider how fund managers respond to the conflicting preferences of their investors. We focus on the conflict between the taxable and retirement accounts of international funds, which face different tradeoffs between dividends and capital gains. In principle, managers could resolve this conflict through dividend arbitrage, but a proprietary database of dividend-arbitrage transactions shows that in practice they cannot. Thus, managers must resolve it through their investment policies. We fi...
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作者：Khwaja, AI; Mian, A
作者单位：University of Chicago; Harvard University
摘要：How costly is the poor governance of market intermediaries? Using unique trade level data from the stock market in Pakistan, we find that when brokers trade on their own behalf, they earn annual rates of return that are 50-90 percentage points higher than those earned by outside investors. Neither market timing nor liquidity provision by brokers can explain this profitability differential. Instead we find compelling evidence for a specific trade-based pump and dump price manipulation scheme: W...
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作者：Acharya, VV; Pedersen, LH
作者单位：New York University; University of London; London Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper solves explicitly a simple equilibrium model with liquidity risk. In our liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model, a security's required return depends on its expected liquidity as well as on the covariances of its own return and liquidity with the market return and liquidity. In addition, a persistent negative shock to a security's liquidity results in low contemporaneous returns and high predicted future returns. The model provides a unified framework for understanding the v...
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作者：Rutherford, RC; Springer, TM; Yavas, A
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; State University System of Florida; Florida Atlantic University
摘要：When a homeowner uses an agent to sell his property, lie may have less information than his agent and be disadvantaged in price setting and negotiating. This study examines whether the percentage commission structure in real estate brokerage creates agency problems. We investigate whether agents are able to use their information advantage to either sell their own property faster or for a higher price than their clients' properties. The empirical results confirm our theoretical predictions of a...
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作者：Nagel, S
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Short-sale constraints are most likely to bind among stocks with low institutional ownership. Because of institutional constraints, most professional investors simply never sell short and hence cannot trade against overpricing of stocks they do not own. Furthermore, stock loan supply tends to be sparse and short selling more expensive when institutional ownership is low. Using institutional ownership as a proxy, I find that short-sale constraints help explain cross-sectional stock return anoma...
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作者：Dinç, IS
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Government ownership of banks is very common in countries other than the United States. This paper provides cross-country, bank-level empirical evidence about political influences on these banks. It shows that government-owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to private banks. This effect is robust to controlling for country-specific macroeconomic and institutional factors as well as bank-specific factors. The increase in lending is about 11% of a government-owned bank's...
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作者：Loughran, T; Schultz, P
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：Our paper examines the impact of geographic location on liquidity for U.S. rural- and Urban-based companies. Even after adjusting for size and other Factors, rural firms trade much less, are covered by fewer analysts, and are owned by fewer institutions than urban firms. Trading costs are higher for rural Nasdaq firms, and volume that can be attributed to marketwide factors is lower for rural stocks. The findings add to our understanding of the way that access to information and familiarity af...
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作者：Battalio, RH; Mendenhall, RR
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：We provide evidence that identifiable subsets of investors use significantly different information sets. Investors initiating large trades respond to analysts' earnings forecast errors, while investors initiating small trades respond to a less-sophisticated signal that underestimates the implications of current earnings innovations for future earnings levels. This suggests small investors exhibit the behavior that Bernard and Thomas [Journal of Accounting and Economics 13, 305-340] theorize ca...
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作者：Goldman, E; Qian, J
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Boston College
摘要：We offer an explanation for why raiders do not acquire the maximum possible toehold prior to announcing a takeover bid. By endogenously modeling the target firm's value following an unsuccessful takeover we demonstrate that a raider may optimally acquire a small toehold even if the acquisition does not drive up the pre-tender target price. This occurs because although a larger toehold increases profits if the takeover Succeeds it also conveys a higher level of managerial entrenchment and hence...
