Conflicts between principals and agents: evidence from residential brokerage

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rutherford, RC; Springer, TM; Yavas, A
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; State University System of Florida; Florida Atlantic University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.006
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 627-665
• 关键词: Agency theory; percentage commission contract; residential brokerage

摘要

When a homeowner uses an agent to sell his property, lie may have less information than his agent and be disadvantaged in price setting and negotiating. This study examines whether the percentage commission structure in real estate brokerage creates agency problems. We investigate whether agents are able to use their information advantage to either sell their own property faster or for a higher price than their clients' properties. The empirical results confirm our theoretical predictions of agency problems, as we find that agent-owned houses sell no faster than client-owned houses, but they do sell at a price premium of approximately 4.5%. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.