Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dinç, IS
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.011
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 453-479
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; political economy; CORRUPTION; State-owned enterprises; electoral cycle

摘要

Government ownership of banks is very common in countries other than the United States. This paper provides cross-country, bank-level empirical evidence about political influences on these banks. It shows that government-owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to private banks. This effect is robust to controlling for country-specific macroeconomic and institutional factors as well as bank-specific factors. The increase in lending is about 11% of a government-owned bank's total loan portfolio or about 0.5% of the median country's GDP per election per government-owned bank. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.