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作者：Bris, Arturo; Goetzmann, William N.; Zhu, Ning
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Yale University
摘要：We analyze cross-sectional and time-series information from 46 equity markets around the world to consider whether short sales restrictions affect the efficiency of the market and the distributional characteristics of returns to individual stocks and market indices. We find some evidence that prices incorporate negative information faster in countries where short sales are allowed and practiced. A common conjecture by regulators is that short sales restrictions can reduce the relative severity...
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作者：Cohen, Lauren; Diether, Karl B.; Malloy, Christopher J.
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作者：Xu, Jianguo
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作者：Harford, Jarrad; Li, Kai
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of British Columbia
摘要：We explore how compensation policies following mergers affect a CEO's incentives to pursue a merger. We find that even in mergers where bidding shareholders are worse off, bidding CEOs are better off three quarters of the time. Following a merger, a CEO's pay and overall wealth become insensitive to negative stock performance, but a CEO's wealth rises in step with positive stock performance. Corporate governance matters; bidding firms with stronger boards retain the sensitivity of their CEOs' ...
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作者：Giaccotto, Carmelo; Goldberg, Gerson M.; Hegde, Shantaram P.
作者单位：University of Connecticut; Roger Williams University
摘要：Under the common assumption of constant interest rates, we show that penalties for early termination of a lease are often structured in such a way that the cancellation option embedded in consumer automotive leases has little value. Furthermore, our estimates drawn from a sample of three popular car models over 1990 to 2000 indicate that the stand-alone value of the lease-end purchase option is, on average, about 16% of the market value of underlying used vehicles, or about $1,462 per contract...
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作者：Qian, Jun; Strahan, Philip E.
作者单位：Boston College; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Legal and institutional differences shape the ownership and terms of bank loans across the world. We show that under strong creditor protection, loans have more concentrated ownership, longer maturities, and lower interest rates. Moreover, the impact of creditor rights on loans depends on borrower characteristics such as the size and tangibility of assets. Foreign banks appear especially sensitive to the legal and institutional environment, with their ownership declining relative to domestic b...
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作者：Hennessy, Christopher A.; Whited, Toni M.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We apply simulated method of moments to a dynamic model to infer the magnitude of financing costs. The model features endogenous investment, distributions, leverage, and default. The corporation faces taxation, costly bankruptcy, and linear-quadratic equity flotation costs. For large (small) firms, estimated marginal equity flotation costs start at 5.0% (10.7%) and bankruptcy costs equal to 8.4% (15.1%) of capital. Estimated financing frictions are higher for low-dividend firms and those ident...
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作者：Buraschi, Andrea; Jiltsov, Alexei
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Imperial College London; Imperial College London
摘要：This paper introduces a new class of nonaffine models of the term structure of interest rates that is supported by an economy with habit formation. Distinguishing features of the model are that the interest rate dynamics are nonlinear, interest rates depend on lagged monetary and consumption shocks, and the price of risk is not a constant multiple of interest rate volatility. We find that habit persistence can help reproduce the nonlinearity of the spot rate process, the documented deviations ...
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作者：Adam, Tim; Dasgupta, Sudipto; Titman, Sheridan
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作者：Sundaram, Pangarajan K.; Yermack, David L.
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Though widely used in executive compensation, inside debt has been almost entirely overlooked by prior work. We initiate this research by studying CEO pension arrangements in 237 large capitalization firms. Among our findings are that CEO compensation exhibits a balance between debt and equity incentives; the balance shifts systematically away from equity and toward debt as CEOs grow older; annual increases in pension entitlements represent about 10% of overall CEO compensation, and about 13% ...
