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作者：Davis, Steven J.; Haltiwanger, John; Handley, Kyle; Jarmin, Ron; Lerner, Josh; Miranda, Javier
作者单位：University of Chicago; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Harvard University
摘要：Private equity critics claim that leveraged buyouts bring huge job losses and few gains in operating performance. To evaluate these claims, we construct and analyze a new dataset that covers US buyouts from 1980 to 2005. We track 3,200 target firms and their 150,000 establishments before and after acquisition, comparing to controls defined by industry, size, age, and prior growth. Buyouts lead to modest net job losses but large increases in gross job creation and destruction. Buyouts also brin...
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作者：Bertrand, Marianne; Bombardini, Matilde; Trebbi, Francesco
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of British Columbia
摘要：Do lobbyists provide issue-specific information to members of Congress? Or do they provide special interests access to politicians? We present evidence to assess the role of issue expertise versus connections in the US Federal lobbying process and illustrate how both are at work. In support of the connections view, we show that lobbyists follow politicians they were initially connected to when those politicians switch to new committee assignments. In support of the expertise view, we show that...
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作者：Ngai, L. Rachel; Tenreyro, Silvana
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Every year housing markets in the United Kingdom and the United States experience systematic above-trend increases in prices and transactions during the spring and summer (hot season) and below-trend falls during the autumn and winter (cold season). House price seasonality poses a challenge to existing housing models. We propose a search-and-matching model with thick-market effects. In thick markets, the quality of matches increases, rising buyers' willingness to pay and sellers' desire to tra...
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作者：Ben-Porath, Elchanan; Dekel, Eddie; Lipman, Barton L.
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Boston University
摘要：A principal allocates an object to one of I agents. Each agent values receiving the object and has private information regarding the value to the principal of giving it to him. There are no monetary transfers, but the principal can check an agent's information at a cost. A favored-agent mechanism specifies a value v* and an agent i*. If all agents other than i* report values below v*, then i* receives the good and no one is checked. Otherwise, whoever reports the highest value is checked and r...
