作者：Phillips, PCB
摘要：Our general subject is model determination methods and their use in the prediction of economic time series. The methods suggested are Bayesian in spirit but they can be justified by classical as well as Bayesian arguments. The main part of the paper is concerned with model determination, forecast evaluation, and the construction of evolving sequences of models that can adapt in dimension and form (including the way in which any nonstationarity in the data is modelled) as new characteristics in...
作者：Manelli, AM
摘要：Well-behaved infinite signaling games may have no sequential equilibria. We prove that adding cheap talk to these games ''solves'' the nonexistence problem: the limit of sequential equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is a sequential equilibrium outcome of the cheap-talk extension of the limit game. In addition, when the signaling space has no isolated points, any cheap-talk sequential equilibrium outcome can be approximated by a sequential epsilon-equilibrium of the game without...
