Cheap talk and sequential equilibria in signaling games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manelli, AM
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.2307/2171850
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 917-942
• 关键词: SUBGAME-PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM; INFORMATION; EXISTENCE; strategies; outcomes

摘要

Well-behaved infinite signaling games may have no sequential equilibria. We prove that adding cheap talk to these games ''solves'' the nonexistence problem: the limit of sequential equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is a sequential equilibrium outcome of the cheap-talk extension of the limit game. In addition, when the signaling space has no isolated points, any cheap-talk sequential equilibrium outcome can be approximated by a sequential epsilon-equilibrium of the game without cheap talk.