作者：Ely, JC; Hörner, J; Olszewski, W
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his opponents' private histories. We provide a simple and sharp characterization of equilibrium payoffs using those strategies. While such strategies support a large set of payoffs, they are not rich enough to gener...
作者：Rivkin, SG; Hanushek, EA; Kain, JF
作者单位：Amherst College; Stanford University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This paper disentangles the impact of schools and teachers in influencing achievement with special attention given to the potential problems of omitted or mismeasured variables and of student and school selection. Unique matched panel data from the UTD Texas Schools Project permit the identification of teacher quality based on student performance along with the impact of specific, measured components of teachers and schools. Semiparametric lower bound estimates of the variance in teacher quali...
