Belief-free equilibria in repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ely, JC; Hörner, J; Olszewski, W
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Northwestern University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00583.x
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 377-415
• 关键词: repeated prisoners-dilemma; folk theorem; EFFICIENCY

摘要

We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his opponents' private histories. We provide a simple and sharp characterization of equilibrium payoffs using those strategies. While such strategies support a large set of payoffs, they are not rich enough to generate a folk theorem in most games besides the prisoner's dilemma, even when noise vanishes.