-
作者：Ballester, Coralio; Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Autonomous University of Barcelona; ICREA; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Le Mans Universite
摘要：Finite population noncooperative games with linear-quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with a globally uniform payoff substitutability component and an own-concavity effect. For these games, the Nash equilibrium action of each player is proportional to her Bonacich centrality in the network of local complementarities, thus establishing a bridge with the sociology literature...
-
作者：Benkard, C. Lanier; Berry, Steven
作者单位：Stanford University; Yale University
摘要：This note revisits the identification theorems of Brown (1983) and Roehrig (1988). We describe an error in the proofs of the main identification theorems in these papers, and provide an important counterexample to the theorems on the identification of the reduced form. Specifically, the reduced form of a nonseparable simultaneous equations model is not identified even under the assumptions of these papers. We provide conditions under which the reduced form is identified and is recoverable usin...
-
作者：Wilcox, Nathaniel T.
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：Comparisons of learning models in repeated games have been a central preoccupation of experimental and behavioral economics over the last decade. Much of this work begins with pooled estimation of the model(s) under scrutiny. I show that in the presence of parameter heterogeneity, pooled estimation can produce a severe bias that tends to unduly favor reinforcement learning relative to belief learning. This occurs when comparisons are based on goodness of fit and when comparisons are based on t...
-
作者：Sun, Ning; Yang, Zaifu
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Yokohama National University
摘要：This paper examines an exchange economy with heterogeneous indivisible objects that can be substitutable or complementary. We show that a competitive equilibrium exists in such economies, provided that all the objects can be partitioned into two groups, and from the viewpoint of each agent, objects in the same group are substitutes and objects across the two groups are complements. This condition generalizes the well-known Kelso-Crawford gross substitutes condition and is called gross substitu...
-
作者：Cullen, Julie Berry; Jacob, Brian A.; Levitt, Steven
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Harvard University; University of Chicago
摘要：School choice has become an increasingly prominent strategy for enhancing academic achievement. To evaluate the impact on participants, we exploit randomized lotteries that determine high school admission in the Chicago Public Schools. Compared to those students who lose lotteries, students who win attend high schools that are better in a number of dimensions, including peer achievement and attainment levels. Nonetheless, we find little evidence that winning a lottery provides any systematic b...
-
作者：Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Roemer, John E.
作者单位：Universidad de Malaga; Universite Catholique Louvain; Yale University; Yale University
摘要：The ethic of priority is a compromise between the extremely compensatory ethic of outcome equality and the needs-blind ethic of resource equality. We propose an axiom of priority and characterize resource-allocation rules that are impartial, prioritarian, and solidaristic. They comprise a class of rules that equalize across individuals some index of outcome and resources. Consequently, we provide an ethical rationalization for the many applications in which such indices have been used (e.g., t...
-
作者：Deneckere, Raymond; Liang, Meng-Yu
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a perfect signal that determines the value of the object to both players, whereas the buyer remains uninformed. We analyze the infinite-horizon bargaining game in which the buyer makes all the offers. When the static incentive constraints permit first-best efficiency, then under some regularity conditions the outcome of the sequential bargaining game becomes arbitrarily efficient as bargaining frictions van...
