-
作者：Bajari, Patrick; Hong, Han; Ryan, Stephen P.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute all of the Nash equilibria to a game, we propose simulation-based estimators for static, discrete games. We demonstrate that the model is identified under weak functional form assumptions using exclusion ...
-
作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：Columbia University; Yonsei University; Stanford University
摘要：The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assigning objects. The mechanism is easy to implement and strategy-proof. However, this mechanism is inefficient, because all agents may be made better off by another mechanism that increases their chances of obtaining more preferred objects. This form of inefficiency is eliminated by a mechanism called probabilistic serial, but this mechanism is not strategy-proof. Thus, which mechanism to employ in practical ap...
-
作者：Ashlagi, Itai; Braverman, Mark; Hassidim, Avinatan; Monderer, Dov
作者单位：Harvard University; Microsoft; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.
-
作者：Heckman, James J.; Matzkin, Rosa L.; Nesheim, Lars
作者单位：University of Chicago; Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper studies the identification and estimation of preferences and technologies in equilibrium hedonic models. In it, we identify nonparametric structural relationships with nonadditive heterogeneity. We determine what features of hedonic models can be identified from equilibrium observations in a single market under weak assumptions about the available information. We then consider use of additional information about structural functions and heterogeneity distributions. Separability cond...
