Monotonicity and Implementability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ashlagi, Itai; Braverman, Mark; Hassidim, Avinatan; Monderer, Dov
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Microsoft; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Technion Israel Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA8882
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1749-1772
• 关键词: design

摘要

Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.