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作者：Komunjer, Ivana; Ng, Serena
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Columbia University
摘要：This paper studies dynamic identification of parameters of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model from the first and second moments of the data. Classical results for dynamic simultaneous equations do not apply because the state space solution of the model does not constitute a standard reduced form. Full rank of the Jacobian matrix of derivatives of the solution parameters with respect to the parameters of interest is necessary but not sufficient for identification. We use restriction...
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作者：Gossner, Olivier
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We introduce entropy techniques to study the classical reputation model in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run players. The long-run player's actions are possibly imperfectly observed. We derive explicit lower and upper bounds on the equilibrium payoffs to the long-run player.
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作者：Reny, Philip J.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We generalize Athey's (2001) and McAdams' (2003) results on the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games. We allow action spaces to be compact locally complete metric semilattices and type spaces to be partially ordered probability spaces. Our proof is based on contractibility rather than convexity of best-reply sets. Several examples illustrate the scope of the result, including new applications to multi-unit auctions with risk-averse bidders.
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作者：Hoerner, Johannes; Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to 1 for stochastic games with observable states and public (but not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long-run players') equilibrium payoffs is independent of the initial state. This is the case, for instance, if the Markov chain induced by any Markov strategy profile is irreducible. We then provide conditions under which a folk theorem obtains: if in each stat...
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作者：Holmes, Thomas J.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The rollout of Wal-Mart store openings followed a pattern that radiated from the center outward, with Wal-Mart maintaining high store density and a contiguous store network all along the way. This paper estimates the benefits of such a strategy to Wal-Mart, focusing on the savings in distribution costs afforded by a dense network of stores. The paper takes a revealed preference approach, inferring the magnitude of density economies from how much sales cannibalization of closely packed stores W...
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作者：Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Dubra, Juan
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Universidad de Montevideo
摘要：It is common for a majority of people to rank themselves as better than average on simple tasks and worse than average on difficult tasks. The literature takes for granted that this apparent misconfidence is problematic. We argue, however, that this behavior is consistent with purely rational Bayesian updaters. In fact, better-than-average data alone cannot be used to show overconfidence; we indicate which type of data can be used. Our theory is consistent with empirical patterns found in the ...
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作者：Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen; Knudsen, Martin B.; Kreiner, Claus Thustrup; Pedersen, Soren; Saez, Emmanuel
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Copenhagen; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper analyzes a tax enforcement field experiment in Denmark. In the base year, a stratified and representative sample of over 40,000 individual income tax filers was selected for the experiment. Half of the tax filers were randomly selected to be thoroughly audited, while the rest were deliberately not audited. The following year, threat-of-audit letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers in both groups. We present three main empirical findings. First, using baseline audit dat...
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作者：Faingold, Eduardo; Sannikov, Yuliy
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University
摘要：We study reputation dynamics in continuous-time games in which a large player (e.g., government) faces a population of small players (e.g., households) and the large player's actions are imperfectly observable. The major part of our analysis examines the case in which public signals about the large player's actions are distorted by a Brownian motion and the large player is either a normal type, who plays strategically, or a behavioral type, who is committed to playing a stationary strategy. We...
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作者：Hansen, Peter R.; Lunde, Asger; Nason, James M.
作者单位：Stanford University; Aarhus University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia
摘要：This paper introduces the model confidence set (MCS) and applies it to the selection of models. A MCS is a set of models that is constructed such that it will contain the best model with a given level of confidence. The MCS is in this sense analogous to a confidence interval for a parameter. The MCS acknowledges the limitations of the data, such that uninformative data yield a MCS with many models, whereas informative data yield a MCS with only a few models. The MCS procedure does not assume t...
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作者：Fieler, Ana Cecilia
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：The standard gravity model predicts that trade flows increase in proportion to importer and exporter total income, regardless of how income is divided into income per capita and population. Bilateral trade data, however, show that trade grows strongly with income per capita and is largely unresponsive to population. I develop a general equilibrium Ricardian model of trade that allows the elasticity of trade with respect to income per capita and with respect to population to diverge. Goods are ...
