On the Existence of Monotone Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Reny, Philip J.
署名单位：
University of Chicago
刊物名称：
ECONOMETRICA
ISSN/ISSBN：
0012-9682
DOI：
10.3982/ECTA8934
发表日期：
2011
页码：
499-553
关键词：
摘要：
We generalize Athey's (2001) and McAdams' (2003) results on the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games. We allow action spaces to be compact locally complete metric semilattices and type spaces to be partially ordered probability spaces. Our proof is based on contractibility rather than convexity of best-reply sets. Several examples illustrate the scope of the result, including new applications to multi-unit auctions with risk-averse bidders.
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