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作者：Gousse, Marion; Jacquemet, Nicolas; Robin, Jean-Marc
作者单位：Laval University; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); University of London; University College London
摘要：We develop a search model of marriage where men and women draw utility from private consumption and leisure, and from a non-market good that is produced in the home using time resources. We condition individual decisions on wages, education, and an index of family attitudes. A match-specific, stochastic bliss shock induces variation in matching given wages, education, and family values, and triggers renegotiation and divorce. Using BHPS (1991-2008) data, we take as given changes in wages, educ...
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作者：Schaal, Edouard
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI)
摘要：This paper studies the impact of time-varying idiosyncratic risk at the establishment level on unemployment fluctuations over 1972-2009. I build a tractable directed search model with firm dynamics and time-varying idiosyncratic volatility. The model allows for endogenous separations, entry and exit, and job-to-job transitions. I show that the model can replicate salient features of the microeconomic behavior of firms and that the introduction of volatility improves the fit of the model for st...
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作者：Miller, Nathan H.; Weinberg, Matthew C.
作者单位：Georgetown University; Drexel University
摘要：We document abrupt increases in retail beer prices just after the consummation of the MillerCoors joint venture, both for MillerCoors and its major competitor, Anheuser-Busch. Within the context of a differentiated-products pricing model, we test and reject the hypothesis that the price increases can be explained by movement from one Nash-Bertrand equilibrium to another. Counterfactual simulations imply that prices after the joint venture are 6%-8% higher than they would have been with Nash-Be...
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作者：Bogomolnaia, Anna; Moulin, Herve; Sandomirskiy, Fedor; Yanovskaya, Elena
作者单位：University of Glasgow; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：A mixed manna contains goods (that everyone likes) and bads (that everyone dislikes), as well as items that are goods to some agents, but bads or satiated to others. If all items are goods and utility functions are homogeneous of degree 1 and concave (and monotone), the competitive division maximizes the Nash product of utilities (Gale-Eisenberg): hence it is welfarist (determined by the set of feasible utility profiles), unique, continuous, and easy to compute. We show that the competitive di...
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作者：Peski, Marcin; Toikka, Juuso
作者单位：University of Toronto; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We develop a theory of how the value of an agent's information advantage depends on the persistence of information. We focus on strategic situations with strict conflict of interest, formalized as stochastic zero-sum games where only one of the players observes the state that evolves according to a Markov operator. Operator Q is said to be better for the informed player than operator P if the value of the game under Q is higher than under P regardless of the stage game. We show that this defin...
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作者：Kolotilin, Anton; Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy; Li, Ming
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Kyiv School of Economics; University of St Andrews; Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments...
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作者：Acharya, Avidit; Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Stanford University; Boston University
摘要：We study a dynamic principal-agent relationship with adverse selection and limited commitment. We show that when the relationship is subject to productivity shocks, the principal may be able to improve her value over time by progressively learning the agent's private information. She may even achieve her first-best payoff in the long run. The relationship may also exhibit path dependence, with early shocks determining the principal's long-run value. These findings contrast sharply with the res...
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作者：Bandi, Federico M.; Pirino, Davide; Reno, Roberto
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa; University of Verona
摘要：We introduce a novel economic indicator, named excess idle time (EXIT), measuring the extent of sluggishness in financial prices. Under a null and an alternative hypothesis grounded in no-arbitrage (the null) and market microstructure (the alternative) theories of price determination, we derive a limit theory for EXIT leading to formal tests for staleness in the price adjustments. Empirical implementation of the theory indicates that financial prices are often more sluggish than implied by the...
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作者：Martinez-Bravo, Monica; Mukherjee, Priya; Stegmann, Andreas
作者单位：William & Mary
摘要：Democracies widely differ in the extent to which powerful elites and interest groups retain influence over politics. While a large literature argues that elite capture is rooted in a country's history, our understanding of the determinants of elite persistence is limited. In this paper, we show that allowing old-regime agents to remain in office during democratic transitions is a key determinant of the extent of elite capture. We exploit quasi-random from Indonesia: Soeharto-regime mayors were...
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作者：Hastings, Justine; Hortacsu, Ali; Syverson, Chad
作者单位：Brown University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; University of Chicago
摘要：This paper examines how sales force impacts competition and equilibrium prices in the context of a privatized pension market. We use detailed administrative data on fund manager choices and worker characteristics at the inception of Mexico's privatized social security system, where fund managers had to set prices (management fees) at the national level, but could select sales force levels by local geographic areas. We develop and estimate a model of fund manager choice where sales force can in...
