Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kolotilin, Anton; Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy; Li, Ming
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Kyiv School of Economics; University of St Andrews; Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13251
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1949-1964
• 关键词: dominant-strategy implementation; OPTIMAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE; Bayesian persuasion; auctions; games

摘要

We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.