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作者：Beraja, Martin; Hurst, Erik; Ospina, Juan
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Chicago; Banco de la Republica Colombia
摘要：Making inferences about aggregate business cycles from regional variation alone is difficult because of economic channels and shocks that differ between regional and aggregate economies. However, we argue that regional business cycles contain valuable information that can help discipline models of aggregate fluctuations. We begin by documenting a strong relationship across U.S. states between local employment and wage growth during the Great Recession. This relationship is much weaker in U.S. ...
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作者：Gruener, Hans Peter; Troeger, Thomas
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：How should a society choose between two social alternatives if participation in the decision process is voluntary and costly, and monetary transfers are not feasible? Assuming symmetric independent private values, we show that it is utilitarian-optimal to use a linear voting rule: votes get alternative-dependent weights, and a default obtains if the weighted sum of votes stays below some threshold. Any combination of weights and threshold can be optimal. A standard quorum rule can be optimal o...
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作者：Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; Strzalecki, Tomasz
作者单位：Yale University; Harvard University
摘要：We provide an axiomatic analysis of dynamic random utility, characterizing the stochastic choice behavior of agents who solve dynamic decision problems by maximizing some stochastic process (U-t) of utilities. We show first that even when (U-t) is arbitrary, dynamic random utility imposes new testable across-period restrictions on behavior, over and above period-by-period analogs of the static random utility axioms. An important feature of dynamic random utility is that behavior may appear his...
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作者：Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This paper shows that bargainers may reach delayed agreements even in environments where there is no uncertainty about payoffs or feasible actions. Under such conditions, delay may arise when bargainers face direct forms of strategic uncertainty-that is, uncertainty about the opponent's play. The paper restricts the nature of this uncertainty in two important ways. First, it assumes on-path strategic certainty: Bargainers face uncertainty only after surprise moves. Second, it assumes Battigall...
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作者：Rosenberg, Dinah; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We revisit prominent learning models in which a sequence of agents make a binary decision on the basis of both a private signal and information related to past choices. We analyze the efficiency of learning in these models, measured in terms of the expected welfare. We show that, irrespective of the distribution of private signals, learning efficiency is the same whether each agent observes the entire sequence of earlier decisions or only the previous decision. In addition, we provide a simple...
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作者：de Castro, Luciano; Galvao, Antonio F.
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Arizona
摘要：This paper develops a dynamic model of rational behavior under uncertainty, in which the agent maximizes the stream of future tau-quantile utilities, for tau is an element of (0,1). That is, the agent has a quantile utility preference instead of the standard expected utility. Quantile preferences have useful advantages, including the ability to capture heterogeneity and allowing the separation between risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Although quantiles do not share s...
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作者：Carroll, Gabriel; Egorov, Georgy
作者单位：Stanford University; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：A receiver wants to learn multidimensional information from a sender, and she has the capacity to verify just one dimension. The sender's payoff depends on the belief he induces, via an exogenously given monotone function. We show that by using a randomized verification strategy, the receiver can learn the sender's information fully in many cases. We characterize exactly when it is possible to do so. In particular, when the exogenous payoff function is submodular, we can explicitly describe a ...
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作者：Uslu, Semih
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：I develop a search-and-bargaining model of endogenous intermediation in over-the-counter markets. Unlike the existing work, my model allows for rich investor heterogeneity in three simultaneous dimensions: preferences, inventories, and meeting rates. By comparing trading-volume patterns that arise in my model and are observed in practice, I argue that the heterogeneity in meeting rates is the main driver of intermediation patterns. I find that investors with higher meeting rates (i.e., fast in...
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作者：Borgers, Tilman; Li, Jiangtao
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Singapore Management University
摘要：We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call strategic simplicity, and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if choices can be based on first-order beliefs about the other agents' preferences and first-order certainty about the other agents' rationality alone, and there is no need for agents to form higher-order beliefs, because s...
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作者：Besley, Tim
