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作者：Sheng, Shuyang
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：The objective of this paper is to identify and estimate network formation models using observed data on network structure. We characterize network formation as a simultaneous-move game, where the utility from forming a link depends on the structure of the network, thereby generating strategic interactions between links. With the prevalence of multiple equilibria, the parameters are not necessarily point identified. We leave the equilibrium selection unrestricted and propose a partial identific...
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作者：Georgiadis, George; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper considers a Principal-Agent model with hidden action in which the Principal can monitor the Agent by acquiring independent signals conditional on effort at a constant marginal cost. The Principal aims to implement a target effort level at minimal cost. The main result of the paper is that the optimal information-acquisition strategy is a two-threshold policy and, consequently, the equilibrium contract specifies two possible wages for the Agent. This result provides a rationale for t...
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作者：Mirrokni, Vahab; Paes Leme, Renato; Tang, Pingzhong; Zuo, Song
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Tsinghua University
摘要：We introduce a new family of dynamic mechanisms that restricts sellers from using future distributional knowledge. Since the allocation and pricing of each auction period do not depend on the type distributions of future periods, we call this family of dynamic mechanisms non-clairvoyant. We develop a framework (bank account mechanisms) for characterizing, designing, and proving lower bounds for dynamic mechanisms (clairvoyant or non-clairvoyant). We use the same methods to compare the revenue ...
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作者：Ilut, Cosmin; Valchev, Rosen; Vincent, Nicolas
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要：We propose a new theory of price rigidity based on firms' Knightian uncertainty about their competitive environment. This uncertainty has two key implications. First, firms learn about the shape of their demand function from past observations of quantities sold. This learning gives rise to kinks in the expected profit function at previously observed prices, making those prices both sticky and more likely to reoccur. Second, uncertainty about the relationship between aggregate and industry-leve...
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作者：Babus, Ana; Kondor, Peter; Wang, Yilin
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
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作者：Moscona, Jacob; Nunn, Nathan; Robinson, James A.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; University of Chicago
摘要：We test the longstanding hypothesis that ethnic groups organized around segmentary lineages are more prone to conflict. Ethnographic accounts suggest that in such societies, which are characterized by strong allegiances to distant relatives, individuals are obligated to come to the aid of fellow lineage members when they become involved in conflicts. As a consequence, small disagreements often escalate into larger-scale conflicts involving many individuals. We test for a link between segmentar...
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作者：Kline, Patrick; Saggio, Raffaele; Solvsten, Mikkel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of British Columbia; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We propose leave-out estimators of quadratic forms designed for the study of linear models with unrestricted heteroscedasticity. Applications include analysis of variance and tests of linear restrictions in models with many regressors. An approximation algorithm is provided that enables accurate computation of the estimator in very large data sets. We study the large sample properties of our estimator allowing the number of regressors to grow in proportion to the number of observations. Consis...
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作者：Rostek, Marzena; Yoder, Nathan
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：In this paper, we show that stable outcomes exist in matching environments with complementarities, such as social media platforms or markets for patent licenses. Our results apply to both nontransferable and transferable utility settings, and allow for multilateral agreements and those with externalities. In particular, we show that stable outcomes in these settings are characterized by the largest fixed point of a monotone operator, and so can be found using an algorithm; in the nontransferab...
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作者：Peters, Michael
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：Markups vary systematically across firms and are a source of misallocation. This paper develops a tractable model of firm dynamics where firms' market power is endogenous and the distribution of markups emerges as an equilibrium outcome. Monopoly power is the result of a process of forward-looking, risky accumulation: firms invest in productivity growth to increase markups in their existing products but are stochastically replaced by more efficient competitors. Creative destruction therefore h...
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作者：Cattaneo, Matias D.; Jansson, Michael; Nagasawa, Kenichi
作者单位：Princeton University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; CREATES; University of Warwick
摘要：This paper proposes a valid bootstrap-based distributional approximation forM-estimators exhibiting a Chernoff (1964)-type limiting distribution. For estimators of this kind, the standard nonparametric bootstrap is inconsistent. The method proposed herein is based on the nonparametric bootstrap, but restores consistency by altering the shape of the criterion function defining the estimator whose distribution we seek to approximate. This modification leads to a generic and easy-to-implement res...
