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作者：Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：To measure the benefits of formal contract enforcement for society, I create a market with merchants and buyers, in which buyers can choose whether to buy, and whether to pay. A set of multiple state-favored ethnic groups control the state. I experimentally vary whether formal contracts are required and the composition of buyer-merchant pairs. The design separately identifies the effect of the contracts on the buyers' incentive to pay and on their incentive to buy. I document two ways in which...
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作者：Benhabib, Jess; Perla, Jesse; Tonetti, Christopher
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of British Columbia; Stanford University
摘要：We study how endogenous innovation and technology diffusion interact to determine the shape of the productivity distribution and generate aggregate growth. We model firms that choose to innovate, adopt technology, or produce with their existing technology. Costly adoption creates a spread between the best and worst technologies concurrently used to produce similar goods. The balance of adoption and innovation determines the shape of the distribution; innovation stretches the distribution, whil...
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作者：Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet
作者单位：Koc University; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Boston College
摘要：We study information aggregation when n bidders choose, based on their private information, between two concurrent common-value auctions. There are k(s) identical objects on sale through a uniform-price auction in market s and there are an additional k(r) objects on auction in market r, which is identical to market s except for a positive reserve price. The reserve price in market r implies that information is not aggregated in this market. Moreover, if the object-to-bidder ratio in market s e...
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作者：Fang, Zheng; Seo, Juwon
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper develops a uniformly valid and asymptotically nonconservative test based on projection for a class of shape restrictions. The key insight we exploit is that these restrictions form convex cones, a simple and yet elegant structure that has been barely harnessed in the literature. Based on a monotonicity property afforded by such a geometric structure, we construct a bootstrap procedure that, unlike many studies in nonstandard settings, dispenses with estimation of local parameter spa...
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作者：Gul, Faruk; Natenzon, Paulo; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
作者单位：Princeton University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We introduce random evolving lotteries to study preference for non-instrumental information. Each period, the agent enjoys a flow payoff from holding a lottery that will resolve at the terminal date. We provide a representation theorem for non-separable risk consumption preferences and use it to characterize agents' attitude to non-instrumental information. To address applications, we characterize peak-trough utilities that aggregate trajectories of flow utilities linearly but, in addition, pu...
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作者：Menzel, Konrad
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We propose a bootstrap procedure for data that may exhibit cluster-dependence in two or more dimensions. The asymptotic distribution of the sample mean or other statistics may be non-Gaussian if observations are dependent but uncorrelated within clusters. We show that there exists no procedure for estimating the limiting distribution of the sample mean under two-way clustering that achieves uniform consistency. However, we propose bootstrap procedures that achieve adaptivity with respect to di...
