Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet
• 署名单位: Koc University; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Boston College
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA14935
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2049-2079
• 关键词: aggregation; EFFICIENCY; auctions; FAILURE

摘要

We study information aggregation when n bidders choose, based on their private information, between two concurrent common-value auctions. There are k(s) identical objects on sale through a uniform-price auction in market s and there are an additional k(r) objects on auction in market r, which is identical to market s except for a positive reserve price. The reserve price in market r implies that information is not aggregated in this market. Moreover, if the object-to-bidder ratio in market s exceeds a certain cutoff, then information is not aggregated in market s either. Conversely, if the object-to-bidder ratio is less than this cutoff, then information is aggregated in market s as the market grows arbitrarily large. Our results demonstrate how frictions in one market can disrupt information aggregation in a linked, frictionless market because of the pattern of market selection by imperfectly informed bidders.