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作者：Alvarez, Fernando; Lippi, Francesco; Souganidis, Panagiotis
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Luiss Guido Carli University; University of Chicago
摘要：We study the propagation of monetary shocks in a sticky-price general equilibrium economy where the firms' pricing strategy features a complementarity with the decisions of other firms. In a dynamic equilibrium, the firm's price-setting decisions depend on aggregates, which in turn depend on the firms' decisions. We cast this fixed-point problem as a Mean Field Game and prove several analytic results. We establish existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and characterize the impulse respons...
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作者：Akcigit, Ufuk; Baslandze, Salome; Lotti, Francesca
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; European Central Bank; Bank of Italy
摘要：How do political connections affect firm dynamics, innovation, and creative destruction? We extend a Schumpeterian growth model with political connections that help firms ease bureaucratic and regulatory burden. The model highlights how political connections influence an economy's business dynamism and innovation, and generates a number of implications guiding our empirical analysis. We construct a new large-scale data set for the period 1993-2014, on the universe of firms, workers, and politi...
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作者：Imbens, Guido W.; Bandiera, Oriana; Donaldson, Dave; Halac, Marina; Ho, Kate; Jones, Charles I.; Lipman, Barton L.; Wolinsky, Asher
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作者：Johnson, Justin P.; Rhodes, Andrew; Wildenbeest, Matthijs
作者单位：Cornell University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Arizona
摘要：We investigate the ability of a platform to design its marketplace to promote competition, improve consumer surplus, and increase its own payoff. We consider demand-steering rules that reward firms that cut prices with additional exposure to consumers. We examine the impact of these rules both in theory and by using simulations with artificial intelligence pricing algorithms (specifically Q-learning algorithms, which are commonly used in computer science). Our theoretical results indicate that...
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作者：Dew-Becker, Ian
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper describes the response of the economy to large shocks in a nonlinear production network. A sector's tail centrality measures how a large negative shock transmits to GDP, that is, the systemic risk of the sector. Tail centrality is theoretically and empirically very different from local centrality measures such as sales share-in a benchmark case, it is measured as a sector's average downstream closeness to final production. It also measures how large differences in sector productivit...
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作者：Shi, Liyan
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：I study regulation of noncompete employment contracts, assessing the trade-off between restricting worker mobility and encouraging firm investment. I develop an on-the-job search model in which firms and workers sign dynamic wage contracts with noncompete clauses and firms invest in their workers' general human capital. Employers use noncompete clauses to enforce buyout payments when their workers depart, ultimately extracting rent from future employers. This rent extraction is socially excess...
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作者：Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou; Reed, Tristan
作者单位：Yale University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; The World Bank
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作者：Kaji, Tetsuya; Manresa, Elena; Pouliot, Guillaume
作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University; University of Chicago
摘要：We propose a new simulation-based estimation method, adversarial estimation, for structural models. The estimator is formulated as the solution to a minimax problem between a generator (which generates simulated observations using the structural model) and a discriminator (which classifies whether an observation is simulated). The discriminator maximizes the accuracy of its classification while the generator minimizes it. We show that, with a sufficiently rich discriminator, the adversarial es...
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作者：Chen, Jiafeng
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：This paper notes a simple connection between synthetic control and online learning. Specifically, we recognize synthetic control as an instance of Follow-The-Leader (FTL). Standard results in online convex optimization then imply that, even when outcomes are chosen by an adversary, synthetic control predictions of counterfactual outcomes for the treated unit perform almost as well as an oracle weighted average of control units' outcomes. Synthetic control on differenced data performs almost as...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc; Garrett, Daniel F.
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Essex
摘要：Work on relational employment agreements often predicts low payments or termination for poor performance. The possibility of saving can, however, limit the effectiveness of monetary incentives in motivating an employee with diminishing marginal utility for consumption. We study the role of savings and their observability in optimal relational contracts. We focus on the case where players are not too patient, and hence the constant first-best effort cannot be implemented. If savings are hidden,...
