PLATFORM DESIGN WHEN SELLERS USE PRICING ALGORITHMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johnson, Justin P.; Rhodes, Andrew; Wildenbeest, Matthijs
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Arizona
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19978
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1841-1879
• 关键词: artificial-intelligence; COMPETITION; collusion; agents

摘要

We investigate the ability of a platform to design its marketplace to promote competition, improve consumer surplus, and increase its own payoff. We consider demand-steering rules that reward firms that cut prices with additional exposure to consumers. We examine the impact of these rules both in theory and by using simulations with artificial intelligence pricing algorithms (specifically Q-learning algorithms, which are commonly used in computer science). Our theoretical results indicate that these policies (which require little information to implement) can have strongly beneficial effects, even when sellers are infinitely patient and seek to collude. Similarly, our simulations suggest that platform design can benefit consumers and the platform, but that achieving these gains may require policies that condition on past behavior and treat sellers in a nonneutral fashion. These more sophisticated policies disrupt the ability of algorithms to rotate demand and split industry profits, leading to low prices.