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作者：Bloedel, Alexander W.; Krishna, R. Vijay; Leukhina, Oksana
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Federal Reserve System - USA
摘要：We study the implications of optimal insurance provision for long-run welfare and inequality in economies with persistent private information. A principal insures an agent whose private type follows an ergodic, finite-state Markov chain. The optimal contract always induces immiseration: the agent's consumption and utility decrease without bound. Under positive serial correlation, it also backloads high-powered incentives: the sensitivity of the agent's utility with respect to his reports incre...
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作者：Freyberger, Joachim; Larsen, Bradley J.
作者单位：University of Bonn; Washington University (WUSTL); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This study provides a structural analysis of detailed, alternating-offer bargaining data from eBay, deriving bounds on buyers and sellers private value distributions and the gains from trade using a range of assumptions on behavior and the informational environment. These assumptions range from weak (assuming only that acceptance and rejection decisions are rational) to less weak (e.g., assuming that bargaining offers are weakly increasing in players' private values). We estimate the bounds an...
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作者：Spady, Richard H.; Stouli, Sami
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Oxford; University of Bristol; University of Melbourne
摘要：We propose flexible Gaussian representations for conditional cumulative distribution functions and give a concave likelihood criterion for their estimation. Optimal representations satisfy the monotonicity property of conditional cumulative distribution functions, including in finite samples and under general misspecification. We use these representations to provide a unified framework for the flexible maximum likelihood estimation of conditional density, cumulative distribution, and quantile ...
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作者：Liu, Tingjun; Bernhardt, Dan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick
摘要：We consider a classical auction setting in which an asset/project is sold to buyers who privately receive signals about expected payoffs, and payoffs are more sensitive to a bidder's signal if he runs the project than if another bidder does. We show that a seller can increase revenues by sometimes allocating cash-flow rights and control to different bidders, for example, with the highest bidder receiving cash flows and the second-highest receiving control. Separation reduces a bidder's informa...
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作者：Dekel, Eddie; Quah, John K. -H.; Sinander, Ludvig
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; National University of Singapore; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics for models with adjustment costs. We show that comparative-statics conclusions may be drawn under the usual ordinal complementarity assumptions on the objective function, assuming very little about costs: only a mild monotonicity condition is required. We use this insight to prove a general Le Chatelier principle: under the ordinal complementarity assumptions, if short-run adjustment is subject to a monotone cost, then the long-run response t...
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作者：Abel, Andrew B.; Panageas, Stavros
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Government debt can be rolled over forever without primary surpluses in some stochastic economies, including some economies that are dynamically efficient. In an overlapping-generations model with constant growth rate, g, of labor-augmenting productivity, and with shocks to the durability of capital, we show that along a balanced growth path, the maximum sustainable ratio of bonds to capital is attained when the risk-free interest rate, r f, equals g. Furthermore, this maximal ratio maximizes ...
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作者：Garin, Andrew; Koustas, Dmitri; Mcpherson, Carl; Norris, Samuel; Pecenco, Matthew; Rose, Evan K.; Shem-Tov, Yotam; Weaver, Jeffrey
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of British Columbia; Brown University; University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Southern California
摘要：We study the effect of incarceration on wages, self-employment, and taxes and transfers in North Carolina and Ohio using two quasi-experimental research designs: discontinuities in sentencing guidelines and random assignment to judges. Across both states, incarceration generates short-term drops in economic activity while individuals remain in prison. As a result, a year-long sentence decreases cumulative earnings over five years by 13%. Beyond five years, however, there is no evidence of lowe...
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作者：Almagro, Milena; Dominguez-Iino, Tomas
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper shows the endogeneity of amenities plays a crucial role in determining the welfare distribution of a city's residents. We quantify this mechanism by building a dynamic model of residential choice with heterogeneous households, where consumption amenities are the equilibrium outcome of a market for non-tradables. We estimate our model using Dutch microdata and leveraging variation in Amsterdam's spatial distribution of tourists as a demand shifter, finding significant heterogeneity i...
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作者：Basteck, Christian; Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents, when each agent is to receive one object and has strict preferences over the objects. Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) satisfies equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Answering a longstanding open question, we show that RSD is not characterized by those properties-there are other mechanisms satisfying equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategy-proofness which are not welfa...
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作者：Spiess, Jann
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Econometric analysis typically focuses on the statistical properties of fixed estimators and ignores researcher choices. In this article, I instead approach the analysis of experimental data as a mechanism-design problem that acknowledges that researchers choose between estimators, sometimes based on the data and often according to their own preferences. Specifically, I focus on covariate adjustments, which can increase the precision of a treatment-effect estimate, but open the door to bias wh...
