作者：Backus, Matthew; Blake, Thomas; Tadelis, Steven
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; eBay Inc.; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We outline a framework for the empirical analysis of signaling games based on three features: sorting, incentive compatibility, and beliefs. We apply it to document cheap-talk signaling in the use of round-number offers during negotiations. Using millions of online bargaining interactions, we show that items listed at multiples of $100 receive offers that are 8-12 percent lower but are 15-25 percent more likely to sell, demonstrating the trade-off requisite for incentive compatibility. Those s...
作者：Bond, Timothy N.; Lang, Kevin
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston University
摘要：Happiness is reported in ordered intervals (e.g., very, pretty, not too happy). We review and apply standard statistical results to determine when such data permit identification of two groups' relative average happiness. The necessary conditions for nonparametric identification are strong and unlikely to ever be satisfied. Standard parametric approaches cannot identify this ranking unless the variances are exactly equal. If not, ordered probit findings can be reversed by lognormal transformat...
