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作者：Blum, Bernardo S.; Claro, Sebastian; Horstmann, Ignatius; Rivers, David A.
作者单位：University of Toronto; Universidad de los Andes (Colombia); Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We develop a novel methodology for disentangling the demand and cost drivers of firm heterogeneity when firms sort themselves into different markets, and we apply it to export status differences. Our methodology results in joint estimates of firm-level productivity and of markups in every market, without imposing functional form restrictions on demand. We find that exporters, relative to nonexporters, (i) have flatter domestic demand curves-thicker domestic markets-and (ii) have higher demand ...
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作者：Nirei, Makoto; Scheinkman, Jose A.
作者单位：University of Tokyo; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We present a menu-cost pricing model with a large but finite number n of firms. A firm's nominal price increase lowers other firms' relative prices, thereby inducing further nominal price increases. The distribution of these repricing avalanches converges as n ->infinity to a mixture of generalized Poisson distributions with an indexofdispersion=1/(1-theta)2, where theta is determined by the equilibrium of the continuous limit. We calibrate the model to the US experience during 1988-2005 and o...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Laohakunakorn, Krittanai
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：We extend Garicano's model of optimal organizations by allowing problems to be screened. We show that when screening is as costly as solving problems, optimal organizations are hierarchies as in Garicano's model, but when the cost of screening is small, workers screen all problems that they and the top managers cannot solve, those problems that they screen are sent directly to those who can solve them, and those problems that they neither solve nor screen are passed to the top managers. For in...
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作者：Baqaee, David R.; Farhi, Emmanuel; Sangani, Kunal
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Harvard University
摘要：We propose a supply-side channel for the transmission of monetary policy. We show that when high-markup firms have lower pass-throughs than low-markup firms, then positive demand shocks, such as monetary expansions, alleviate cross-sectional misallocation by reallocating resources to high-markup firms. Consequently, positive demand shocks are accompanied by endogenous positive supply shocks that raise productivity and lower inflation. We derive a tractable, four-equation model where monetary s...
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作者：Budish, Eric; Lee, Robin S.; Shim, John J.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; University of Notre Dame
摘要：Will stock exchanges innovate to address latency arbitrage and the arms race for speed? This paper models how exchanges compete in the modern electronic era and how this shapes incentives for market-design innovation. In the status quo, exchange trading fees are competitive, but exchanges earn economic rents from selling speed. These rents create a wedge between private and social incentives to innovate and support the persistence of an inefficient market design in equilibrium of a market-desi...
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作者：Carneiro, Pedro; Galasso, Emanuela; Garcia, Italo Lopez; Bedregal, Paula; Cordero, Miguel
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University College London; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); The World Bank; University of Southern California; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Universidad del Desarrollo; University of Bristol
摘要：We present results from a large-scale experimental evaluation of a national parenting program in Chile. The program is low cost: it lasts only 6-8 weeks, and it is administered to groups of eight to 12 parents. It is implemented by the national health system, taking advantage of its existing physical infrastructure and human resources. We find that 3 years after the interventions ends, children whose parents are offered the opportunity to participate in this program increase their vocabulary a...
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作者：Ortner, Juan; Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Boston University; Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Cartels and bidding rings are often facilitated by intermediaries, who recommend prices/bids to firms and can impose penalties (such as reverting to competitive behavior in future interactions) if these recommendations are not followed. Motivated by such cases, we study correlated equilibria in first-price procurement auctions with complete information, where bidders who disobey their recommendations are penalized. Cartel-optimal profit is greater when more information about submitted bids is ...
