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作者：Halac, Marina; Yared, Pierre
作者单位：Yale University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We propose a political economy mechanism that explains the presence of fiscal regimes punctuated by crisis periods. Our model focuses on the interaction between successive deficit-biased governments subject to independently and identically distributed fiscal shocks. We show that the economy transitions between a fiscally responsible regime and a fiscally irresponsible regime, with transitions occurring during crises when fiscal needs are large. Under fiscal responsibility, governments limit th...
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作者：Antic, Nemanja; Chakraborty, Archishman; Harbaugh, Rick
作者单位：Northwestern University; Yeshiva University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Two players with common interests exchange information to make a decision. But they fear scrutiny. Their unencrypted communications will be observed by another agent with different interests who can object to their decision. We show how the players can implement their ideal decision rule using a back-and-forth conversation. Such a subversive conversation reveals enough information for the players to determine their best decision but not enough information for the observer to determine whether ...
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作者：Bartelme, Dominick; Costinot, Arnaud; Donaldson, Dave; Rodriguez-Clare, Andres
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The textbook case for industrial policy is well understood: sectors with relatively large external economies of scale should be subsidized at the expense of other sectors. Little is known, however, about the magnitude of the welfare gains from such interventions. We develop an empirical strategy that leverages commonly available trade data to estimate sector-level economies of scale and, in turn, to quantify the gains from optimal industrial policy in a general equilibrium environment. Our res...
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作者：Annan, Francis
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Misconduct-market actions that are unethical and indicative of fraud-is a significant yet poorly understood issue that underlies many economic transactions. We design a field experiment to study the impact of two-sided antimisconduct information programs, which we deploy on the local markets for mobile money (human ATMs) in Ghana. The programs lead to a large reduction in misconduct (-21 percentage points=-72%) and, as a result, broader improvements in overall market activity, consumer welfare...
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作者：Maskin, E.; Saari, D. G.
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作者：Khantadze, Davit; Kremer, Ilan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Warwick; Stanford University
摘要：We consider a Bayesian persuasion model in which multiple receivers take one action each. We compare simultaneous procedures with sequential ones. In a simultaneous procedure, all the receivers act simultaneously following the realization of a single public signal. In a sequential procedure, receivers receive information and take actions sequentially. We characterize the conditions under which the optimal sequential procedure leads to a higher payoff and characterize the optimal ordering of ac...
