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作者：Hong, H; Shum, M
作者单位：Princeton University; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：We assess empirically the effects of the winner's curse which, in common-value auctions, counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases. First, we construct an econometric model of an auction in which bidders' preferences have both common- and private-value components, and propose a new monotone quantile approach which facilitates estimation of this model. Second, we estimate the model using bids from procurement auctions held by the State of New Jersey. For a large ...
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作者：Abadir, K; Talmain, G
作者单位：University of York - UK; Tilburg University; University of York - UK
摘要：We introduce firm heterogeneity into the standard monopolistically competitive real business cycle (RBC) model. The fundamental equilibrium path is derived and the time-series properties of aggregate GDP are studied analytically. Although firms' productivities are subject to temporary shocks, the aggregate process displays a surprising novel form of nonlinearity and long memory which had not been built into the model at the outset. This aggregate GDP turns out to have very different properties...
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作者：Legros, P; Newman, AF
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study frictionless matching in large economies with and without market imperfections, providing sufficient conditions for monotone matching that are weaker than those previously known. Necessary conditions, which depend on a key analytical object we call the surplus function, are also offered. Changes in the surplus yield valuable information about the comparative statics of matching patterns across environments. We apply our framework to some examples adapted from the literature, accountin...
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作者：Offerman, T; Potters, J; Sonnemans, J
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tilburg University
摘要：We examine the force of three types of behavioural dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) rules based on following the exemplary firm, and (3) rules based on belief learning. Theoretically, these three types of rules lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the Cournot-Nash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments, each of which is hypothesized to be conducive to the force of one of the three dynamic r...
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作者：Miravete, EJ
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In this paper, I study the theoretical and econometric implications of agents' uncertainty concerning their future consumption when a monopolist offers them either a unique, mandatory nonlinear tariff or a choice in advance from a menu of optional two-part tariffs. Agents' uncertainty is resolved through individual and privately known shocks to their types. In such a situation the principal may screen agents according to their ex ante or ex post type, by offering either a menu of optional tari...
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作者：Acemoglu, D
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：For many problems in macroeconomics, development economics, tabour economics, and international trade, whether technical change is biased towards particular factors is of central importance. This paper develops a simple framework to analyse the forces that shape these biases. There are two major forces affecting equilibrium bias: the price effect and the market size effect. While the former encourages innovations directed at scarce factors, the latter leads to technical change favouring abunda...
