Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Offerman, T; Potters, J; Sonnemans, J
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam; Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00233
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 973-997
• 关键词: normal-form games; equilibrium; INFORMATION; EVOLUTION; BEHAVIOR; cournot

摘要

We examine the force of three types of behavioural dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) rules based on following the exemplary firm, and (3) rules based on belief learning. Theoretically, these three types of rules lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the Cournot-Nash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments, each of which is hypothesized to be conducive to the force of one of the three dynamic rules. To a large extent, the results are consistent with the hypothesized relationships between treatments, behavioural rules, and outcomes.